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1.  Introduction 
In wartime, environmental destruction is expected, but it is also limited. 
Although nearly a century ago under the Kellogg-Briand Pact1 initially 15 
nations renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual 
relations, it is still used as a means for handling disputes albeit contrary to the 
recommended higher-ground of pacific means. Even though tagged as a toothless 
treaty,2 the global community has endured a lurking threat since that moment in 
time. It is a creeping threat, as humanity has been placed on the alert concerning 
poor earthly conditions and predictions that will not respect man-made 
jurisdictional borders.  
Heeding the call, the United Nations (UN) requested a new mode of international 
co-operation to combat a new sort of enemy – degradation of the natural 
environment. In a constructive pursuit toward building the moral and legal basis 
needed to strengthen the duty to care for the natural world, a variety of political 
instruments and ecological principles were established to address a new global 
target – sustainable development (SD). Yet it seems reasonable that in order to 
meet the needs of the present and future generations by grappling with ways one 
might sustain the natural environment, that foremost, one must untangle and 
understand what might destroy it and ultimately, stand in the way to protect it. 
With destruction in mind, Jared Diamond reveals five main reasons which have 
led societies into either regression or collapse. These five reasons are 
environmental damage, climatic change, hostile neighbors, dependence upon 
commercial partners and the inability to provide appropriate solutions to 
problems faced. 3 Natural resource scarcity has been repeatedly linked to social 
                                              
1 The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) 
2 Britannica Concise Encyclopedia (1928): Kellogg-Briand Pact. [online] http://www.answers.com/topic/kellogg-
briand-pact, (retrieved 10 June 2011) 
3 Nathalie de Pompignan, Ecocide, Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, [online], published on 3 November 2007, 
accessed 9 June 2011, URL : http://www.massviolence.org/Ecocide, ISSN 1961-9898 
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unrest and violent conflict. Additionally, severe environmental consequences of 
armed conflict hold a reputation to trigger enduring conflict.  
Upon cease of hostilities, the condition of the natural environment is a vital 
component to help rebuild societies and sustain human health and livelihoods. 
Dependent on these environmental conditions, various postwar and sustainable 
development challenges could arise. It is within this tangled relationship, that 
military activities and the subsequent conditions for SD become ‘vitally linked.’ 
For within the sphere of wartime destruction is the hidden potential for a vicious 
cycle in need of a virtuous overturn. And it is an overturn which requires a 
special protection in order to meet the needs of the present and future 
generations. 
Sustainable development attempts to set limitations upon the exploitation of the 
planet’s natural resources. Throughout the discourse there are vast concerns in 
relation to transboundary air pollution, radioactive waste, greenhouse gas 
emissions, climatic change, biodiversity loss, genetic diversity loss and more. 
Considering that the concept of ecocide has its origin in military activities, it is 
reasonable to propose that the threat to sustainable development from such 
activities could present further widespread, long-term and severe problems than 
previously considered. In fact, it might be considered a “sustainability show-
stopper” as parts of the world repeatedly suffer from the environmental 
consequences of war – long after the war ends. 
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall 
therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in 
times of armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as 
necessary.4 
 
Whether it is targeted directly or indirectly, particular methods and means of 
warfare should be expected to cause disruption, deterioration or destruction to the 
natural environment. Strikingly however, some scientists claim that particular 
                                              
4 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED 1992). Earth Summit Rio de Janeiro. 19th 
plenary meeting. Rio Declaration, Principle 24.  
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contaminates have threatening life-cycles with no end in sight. International 
humanitarian law (IHL) asserts that “the right of the belligerents to adopt means 
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited,”5 however; some evidence reveals such 
widespread, long-term and severe damage that one might question where the 
limitation line is drawn.  
On the one hand, the international community of states is seemingly striving 
toward sustainable development. Additionally, it is important to note that “the 
only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is 
to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”6 Yet today, there are particular 
military activities that inflict environmental damage not only on an 
unprecedented level, but also of an unprecedented kind. From the creation of 
toxic wastelands to the alteration of humanity’s DNA, “military action is 
important to the nation – it is the ground of death and life, the path to survival 
and destruction, claimed Sun Tzu.”7 Yet to what extent of destruction and death 
is an important consideration for international humanitarian law (IHL).  
IHL sets strict limitations in wartime. And thus far, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) has stated that the law of armed conflict has been slow 
to recognize the environment. It is not a secret that wartime is one of the most 
destructive periods to both humankind and the natural environment. As 
previously noted, even the most advanced and civilized of societies have 
collapsed from environmental damage and hostile neighbors. In the midst of 
existing threats such as environmental modification techniques, biological and 
chemical agents, depleted uranium, nuclear weapons, and more, it seems 
pertinent to undertake a critical assessment of IHL and test its adequacy to 
protect the natural environment in wartime. If it is not being adequately 
                                              
5 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 
6 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint 
Petersburg, 29 November / 11 December 1868. (emphasis mine) 
7 See Sun Tzu translated by Thomas Cleary (1988:1): The Art of War. Boston: Shambhala Publication, Inc. 
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protected, what are the notable weaknesses in the legal framework and how 
might it be strengthened? 
Clearly, the natural environment is an indispensible constituent of sustainable 
development.  If the aim of sustainable development is to remain a realistic target 
for the international community of states – then perhaps, these aspects which 
threaten to destroy it and protect it should be considered. As Steve Turner states: 
Time has shown that the principles of sustainable development alone will not be 
sufficient to protect the environment and that the right to a good environment must be 
recognized on an international level with the appropriate legal mechanisms and 
regulations which govern decision making daily.8 
1.1 Objectives 
The thesis herein contains several objectives. Its overall aim is to attempt a 
critical assessment of international humanitarian law (IHL) and examine its legal 
adequacy in the protection of the natural environment in an armed conflict 
context. Additionally, some vital links between international humanitarian law 
and sustainable development (SD) will be underscored.  
The first objective is to set the background by demonstrating the global 
importance to protect the natural environment in order to achieve SD. Next, an 
attempt is made to uncover the present meaning and interpretation for what a 
natural environment actually is in order to better understand how it is currently  
being identified and protected in an armed conflict – or not.  
The second objective is to undertake a collective case study. Notorious for their 
striking impact on the natural environment, the three cases selected are: Vietnam 
War, Gulf War, and Kosovo Conflict. Throughout the entire assessment, a 
particular emphasis will be placed upon conflicting parties, methods and means 
of warfare, environmental damage, applicable laws, legal interpretations, 
                                              
8 Turner, Steve. (2004) “The Human Right to a Good Environment. The sword in the stone. Non-State Actors and 
International Law.” 4:277-301 
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criminal responsibility and some prospective threats to sustainable development. 
Moreover, the overarching goal will be to establish the factual basis in order to 
demonstrate how the natural environment is or perhaps, is not being respected 
and protected under IHL.   
The third objective is to provide a critical assessment of international 
humanitarian law regarding the protection of the natural environment. In this 
section, the purpose is to demonstrate important functions of this particular body 
of international law and its relevance toward the attainment of SD. Another 
objective is to draw attention to the chronological development of international 
law based upon post-factum revelations and highlight how historically it has 
taken a piecemeal approach toward advancing protection, as required.  
Toward this aim, an assessment of the most important legal sources shall be 
presented. Within the analysis, both direct and indirect methods of protection 
will be reviewed and discussed. IHL principles are also emphasized in order to 
address their distinctive function within the legal framework. Additional texts 
relative to the study and customary international law (CIL) will also be 
examined, weighed and presented.  
The central research question is:  
Does international humanitarian law adequately protect the natural environment in the 
event of an armed conflict? 
 
Following IHLs critical assessment, a sub-question is: 
Are there notable weaknesses within the current legal framework of IHL which may be 
strengthened to enhance the protection of the natural environment in the event of an 
armed conflict? 
 
The fourth objective is to pinpoint some of the notable weaknesses regarding 
protection of the natural environment. And then, the fifth objective is to present 
some practical suggestions in an attempt to strengthen protection of the natural 
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environment during hostilities and ultimately, enhance the security of this vital 
component toward the attainment of sustainable development.  
In conclusion, some of the most relevant findings shall be highlighted in relation 
to a few vital links between international humanitarian law and sustainable 
development. The added consideration of development of special protection for 
the natural environment shall be further discussed in an attempt to rethink a more 
comprehensive approach toward the framework of IHL in order to maintain the 
legitimacy of one of its primary functions – the prevention of unnecessary 
suffering. Important elements of the natural environment’s formal consideration 
during wartime will be expanded upon as present deliberations are forewarned to 
not overlook its vital role in the quest for sustainable development. Ultimately, a 
main objective of the conclusion is to underscore that further limitations upon the 
destruction of the natural environment are deemed necessary in order to establish 
a more meaningful basis for sustainable development, and overall, a more 
realistic foundation to establish international peace and security by enhancing 
international relations through the shared protection of the natural world. 
1.2 Methodology 
The interdisciplinary research herein consists of a mixed methodological 
approach. The first portion of the research involves a discourse, literature and 
journal analysis in relation to sustainable development (SD). As an indispensible 
constituent, a deeper understanding of the role and relevance toward the 
protection of the natural environment in an armed conflict and post-conflict 
context shall be sought-after. Through an enhanced understanding of current 
environmental interests, threats and challenges in the course of international 
relations during peacetime, the above methodological approach aims to 
strengthen the philosophical and practical underpinnings in order to attend to the 
environmental consequences in wartime.  
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To widen the scope of ecological considerations, a brief analysis of international 
environmental law shall be constructed. A number of landmark environmental 
movements, such as, the Stockholm Declaration, Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Montreal Protocol, and more shall 
be studied in order to develop an enhanced sensitivity toward the protective 
interests of the international community of states.  
The next portion of the study involves a critical assessment of international 
humanitarian law (IHL). Varied methods will be utilized, such as narrative and 
textual analysis, media studies and participant observation within IHL forums 
and online seminars. As the official guardian of international humanitarian law, 
the ICRC shall provide an appropriate institutional study as various reports and 
internet sources publicly announce the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and sustainable development. These diverse sources will be 
studied to ascertain the current stance regarding environmental protection in 
wartime.  
The research is also supplemented by a two year voluntary involvement with the 
Oslo Red Cross organization and an advanced study by participation in the IHL 
27th Edition Course in Warsaw, Poland. Through a combination of academic 
lectures and practical exercises the foundational basis for this study shall be 
enhanced. Potential interviews shall be ascertained through this academic and 
professional association, if necessary and permitted.  
To reflect upon the application and adherence to IHL, a collective case study 
shall be undertaken. The Vietnam War, Gulf War, and Kosovo Conflict have all 
been selected as relevant cases to review the legal adequacy of protection for the 
natural environment in wartime. Particular elements of each case such as the 
legal timeline, conflicting parties, methods and means, environmental damage, 
applicable rules, legal interpretation and criminal responsibility will all be 
examined in order to draw a reasonable conclusion. To support this component 
 8
of the research, literature analysis, academic journal analysis, institutional report 
analysis, media studies, and narrative analysis shall be these methods selected. 
1.3 Theoretical Approach    
The theoretical approach is a merger of international relations and development 
theory. Throughout the thesis an attention is placed upon what is commonly 
depicted as developed nations in association with lesser developed countries 
(LDC). With critical thought pertaining to conflicting parties, warfare methods 
and means, and political and military actions deployed which adversely impact 
the social, economic, political and/or cultural dimensions in the course of 
domestic and international relations, such reflections shall provide inputs for the 
theoretical foundation. Intrigued by the post-modernist and neo-modernist 
position, there is a temptation to consider the emergent neo-modernist position 
and states of dependency theory which seem to frame the possible notion of new 
forms of imperialism by the Western world.   
For some states and particular sects of society, the process of development or 
sense of change can bring about violent conflict and instability. Although highly 
arguable, warfare is sometimes considered as a tool of development to bring 
about a renewed state of peace. Modernization is often viewed as a departure 
from traditional ways of living, as materialistic and economic gain becomes an 
important focus toward a new way of life. The thrust of capitalism and 
industrialization by foreign multi-national companies into the LDC has been 
known to serve as a double-edged sword. As the traditional development 
approach with its core focus on solely the economic dimension of human 
existence has been generally perceived as deficient in meaning or spiritual 
essence of human livelihoods. Theoretically, dependent on the conflicting parties 
or actors involved and the source of intentionality fueling the conflict at hand, 
there could arise an analytical sphere to illuminate the type of development being 
sought-after, for example, the process of democratization, the lust for ideological 
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domination or the inequalities of various forms of ethic division. In view of the 
development process, whether immanent or intentional, it seems that much 
insight could be gained from the battlefield and from the stark realities or even 
illusions of human motivation. Within this identity of the military significant 
states coupled with advanced weaponry of the military industrial complex, the 
notion of dependency theory strikes an interesting cord for theoretical analysis.  
Environments of war are abruptly crippled and dependent on numerous levels. 
Within a spilt-second, the physical, psychological, social, political, economical, 
and spiritual dimensions which ultimately sustain human livelihoods and 
wellbeing could become shattered. The total destruction of important physical 
infrastructures and also aspects of the natural environment which provide 
sustenance to the welfare of the state can leave its human population and its 
surroundings in a state of dependency imposed upon by powerful military states. 
Yet, dependent on the circumstances ruling at the time, the use of such potent 
military force will be considered either lawful or unlawful.   
From this position, LDC could have a weaker position on the battlefield as 
military significant states or allied forces utilize war as an instrument under the 
guise of development.  In reality, it is the environmental consequences of 
wartime that plunge lesser developed countries into a state of underdevelopment, 
leaving them totally dependent upon the aid of the wealthier nation-states. 
Through these political and tactical maneuvers of severe destruction, it is 
tempting to consider insights from postcolonial and postmodern lessons-learned. 
Is it a possibility that particular actors inflicting severe forms of destruction upon 
other nations can be viewed as new forms of imperialism though imposing 
conditions of dependency?  
Following the clutch of foreign domination, the process of decolonization and the 
human battle toward independence, could the widespread, long-term and severe 
destruction of the natural environment in wartime be used tactically to create new 
pathways to political power? Could this vital link between humanity and its clear 
 10
dependency on natural resources reveal another development concern between 
the West against the Rest? For example, as it may be perceived through the 
political and military alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  
Based on these lines of thought, the rationale for the theoretical merger between 
international relations and development theory is being considered.  
Furthermore, allegations concerning the greed for oil, the lust for economic gain, 
the gluttony for land and superpower, the humanitarian need for compassion, 
equality and freedom, in addition to the invocation of the jihad seem to be telling 
a story about the ills and cures of neo-modernist development position. It is also 
interesting to reflect upon from an international relation and development 
viewpoint how the blind wrath of military aggression might threaten the 
international hope for a viable solution for sustainable development.   
It is indisputable that the natural environment has become a bargaining chip on 
the international relations table. Its role has been demonstrated repeatedly within 
the Kyoto Protocol, CBD, UNFCCC, and Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, Rome Statue, as well as other various forms of disarmament law 
and eco-friendly movements. These particular developments have continuously 
sought-after legal mechanisms to better regulate protection for the natural 
environment under international law.  
Some lesser developed countries and other states have repeatedly taken a more 
liberalist position toward protection of the natural environment by demonstrating 
a willingness to make political and national sacrifices in a spirit of international 
co-operation toward global environmental security, as encouraged by the United 
Nations and well-documented in the Brundtland Commission Report (BCR). On 
the other hand, some states have repeatedly demonstrated a realist position 
through an unwillingness to make national or political sacrifices, as it might 
hinder a perceived ‘way of life’ and perhaps threaten the cultural, social and/or 
economic sources of political interest. Throughout the thesis, it is my interest to 
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consider these various theoretical crossroads and present some related thoughts 
with respect to matters of international relations and development theory.  
1.4 Thesis Organization  
The overall thesis is organized into six chapters. Each chapter addresses a variety 
of concerns regarding the significance of protection for the natural environment 
during hostilities. Throughout the research, the legal adequacy of IHL to provide 
the necessary legal mechanisms to regulate wartime environmental destruction 
will be critically assessed, while also bearing in mind the international 
development aim toward sustainable development.  
Chapter 2 provides some reflections on various intentions behind the sustainable 
development aim through its driving forces: Stockholm Declaration, Brundtland 
Commission Report, Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 as well as other environmental 
movements and institutions. Some of the sustainable development and 
environmental matters of custom shall be evaluated, such as, the human right to a 
good environment and the principles of precaution, prevention from harm and 
intergenerational ethics. In view of the importance of the natural environment 
toward sustainable development, the concept will be reassessed and its formal 
definition explored.  
Chapter 3 provides a collective case study regarding some of the most prominent 
environmental consequences of wartime. There are three cases studied: the 
Vietnam War, Gulf War and Kosovo Conflict. Within each case selected a keen 
attention shall be directed to the parties to the conflict, methods and means of 
warfare, the extent of environmental damage, the legal regime applicable, legal 
interpretations and the overall adherence to international humanitarian law and 
matters of criminal responsibility. The chapter is designed to ascertain if 
international humanitarian law is presently considered adequate or inadequate in 
the protection of the natural environment in wartime. Additionally, attention is 
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placed toward prospective threats of sustainable development with reference to 
widespread, long-term and severe damage caused from particular military 
activities.  
Chapter 4 presents the historical origin, general purpose and principles of IHL. 
The legal principles in wartime such as military necessity, distinction, 
proportionality and humanity will be studied and discussed. Additionally, the 
main legal sources of protection in wartime whether through indirect or direct 
means, will also be studied and discussed. Some thoughts concerning the overall 
legal framework upheld by the rules of the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols 
Additional, Customary International Law (CIL), the ENMOD Convention, and 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will also be briefly 
touched upon within this chapter.  
Chapter 5 provides some notable weaknesses discovered in the legal framework. 
Some concerns in relation to the characterization of the conflict, ambiguities 
within the law and an apparent absence of key elements in order to establish a 
meaningful framework to protect the natural environment in an armed conflict 
shall be highlighted. Accordingly, some practical suggestions toward enhancing 
the protection for the natural environment will be presented for additional 
research and consideration.   
Chapter 6 provides the conclusion with reference to the overall adequacy of 
protection for the natural environment in wartime. The realism of diverse forms 
of transboundary harm caused by military activities alongside the need to protect 
global interlocking interests of environmental security shall be elevated in an 
attempt to highlight a moral and legal imperative to advance the framework of 
IHL, if sustainable development should ever become realized. As Sun Tzu once 
highlighted within the Art of War: 
The military provides protection, which is crucial to every form of life. Protection 
means respecting one’s integrity, or wholeness, through either warding off or 
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extending outward – through defending or conquering. This may entail conflict. 
Regardless of whether we find this pleasant, we must look into it.9 
                                              
9 The Denma Translation Group (2003: Commentary from Chapter 1): The Art of War Book and Card Deck. China: 
Shambhala Publications 
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2. The Search for Protection of the Natural 
Environment 
2.1  A Global Movement for Environmental Protection 
and Sustainable Development     
The obligation to care for the natural environment can be traced back to the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration. Since this point, environmental awareness has been on 
the rise alongside a host of rightful reasons to protect it. With a common interest 
set in motion, international initiatives and eco-friendly state practices began to 
set the precedent for a more principled relationship with nature. The global shift 
from an anthropocentric to a more biocentric viewpoint was a clear indication 
that limitations must be placed upon a system of finite natural resources. Heeding 
the call of the natural world, a new foundation for environmental and customary 
law was formed. For decades now, it is normally agreed that the natural 
environment is a special object of care. 
Seeing that the natural environment is a fundamental pillar of sustainable 
development, its protection from harm and irreversible damage is a vital concern 
– that is, if the notion of SD should ever be realized. And although the human 
person is well-noted as its central concern, it is certainly not the only concern to 
achieve sustainable development as a whole.  
Despite wide-ranging anthropocentric and biocentric viewpoints amid the 
development discourse, it seems a holistic attitude reinforced by meaningful 
action is increasingly vital. As it stands now, the principles of precaution and 
intergenerational ethics are standard considerations toward the attainment of SD. 
In view of the fact that humanity and the natural environment are vitally linked, it 
seems that the legal obligations associated with the duty to protect and care for 
this interlocked system are essential. For one matter is certain. Planet Earth’s 
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natural resources and forces will not respect man-made jurisdictional borders. In 
the greater scheme of life, every nation is fundamentally dependent upon the 
welfare of the other. As Our Common Future states: 
There are…no military solutions to ‘environmental insecurity.’ And modern warfare 
can itself create major internationally shared environmental hazards. The idea of 
national sovereignty has been modified by the fact of interdependence in the realm of 
economics, environment, and security. The global commons cannot be managed from 
any national center: the nation state is insufficient to deal with threats to shared 
ecosystems. Threats to environmental security can only be dealt with by joint 
management and multilateral procedures and mechanisms. 10 
 
 
To envisage the worth of something, it has been said that one should consider its 
absence. What might one envisage without clean drinking water, fresh air or 
fertile landscapes which provide sustenance to all sentient beings? From another 
view, what might one envisage about the sudden loss of food or safety, the 
chronic fear of violence, or perhaps the void of care for life itself? These are 
pressing concerns at the heart of international development today.  
 
Yet environmental problems are still mounting worldwide. Noting the fact, it was 
deemed sensible to construct a new basis for human activities in collaboration 
with nature. Twenty-six principles set the initial framework for how states ought 
to behave with respect to their international relations “from activities conducted 
in all spheres.”11   Toward its effective implementation, states have been asked to 
“co-operate through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate 
means essential to control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental 
effects.”12  
It was the Stockholm Declaration’s principled force which prompted the 
development of various institutional capacities to steer its green agenda accepted 
then by 103 nations. Within a short period, ecological initiatives led to the 
                                              
10 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987:301): Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
11 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE, 1992): Stockholm Declaration. Principle 24  
12 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE,1992): Stockholm Declaration. Principle 24 
(emphasis mine) 
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advancement of a collective expertise and mechanisms to secure the natural 
environment via the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World 
Charter for Nature, World Commission on Sustainable Development (WCSD), 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 
Convention on Biodiversity (CBD), United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), United Nations Earth Charter, Aarhus Convention 
and other eco-movements inspired through the commendable leadership 
preserved within Our Common Future. 
Within Our Common Future, also known as the Brundtland Commission Report 
(BCR), an important element was at once illuminated to guide the realm of 
international relations. For respecting state responsibility, it was not only 
domestic matters concerning the natural environment that became a mounting 
concern, but also transboundary considerations between states were now on the 
horizon.  
The BCR depicted particular activities which could trigger natural resource 
depletion, ecological stress, economic and social degradation, hazardous 
pollution, toxic waste discharge, space debris, biodiversity and genetic diversity 
loss, and other threatening conditions. Additionally, the report forewarned that 
military activities were a prime threat toward the demise of sustainable 
development.  In order to protect the global environment from potential harm a 
clear direction was provided to enact well-enforced laws and strict liability 
legislation controlling harmful side effects.13                                           
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.14 
 
                                              
13 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED,1987:47): Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.(emphasis mine) 
14 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE, 1972): Stockholm  Declaration, Principle 21. 
(emphasis mine) 
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Yet still, an unsettling grey zone persists. Amid rapid scientific and technological 
advancements, the industrialized age continues to make available 
transformational powers. Ever more elusive, some of these transformational 
threats to the natural environment are camouflaged as serving a “dual-use” 
purpose, for example, biotechnology, chemical production, nuclear capabilities, 
and more. These particular areas remain of special interest concerning global 
environmental security.  
Despite persistent warnings, human civilization still stands accused of producing 
unsafe levels of pollution in the air, water, earth and even within other living 
organisms.15 Not only is the biosphere starting to suffer ecological disturbance 
and climatic change, but also the depletion, degradation and destruction of finite 
natural resources are imposing a widespread, long-term and severe threat to the 
“physical, mental and social health of man.”16 Realizing the need for limitations 
and liability with respect to environmental damage, the Earth Summit established 
Principle 13 which affirms: 
States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims 
of pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an 
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further international law 
regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage 
caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction.17 
 
Upon noticing the vital link between humanity and the natural environment – the 
‘right to a healthy environment’ began to emerge as an international norm. This 
seems a logical development as the right to life, security of person, and liberty are 
inalienable human rights protected by the rule of law.18 Furthermore, it is every 
person in the world that has the right to a standard of living adequate for health 
                                              
15 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE, 1972): Stockholm  Declaration  
16 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE 1972): Stockholm  Declaration  
17 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED 1992): Rio Declaration. Principle 13. 
Earth Summit Rio de Janeiro. 19th plenary meeting. 
18 United Nations (1948): “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Article 3 [online]. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml, (retrieved 8 May 2010). 
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and wellbeing, which includes the basic necessity of food.19 In order to uphold 
these fundamental human rights, it would prove difficult to meet these conditions 
without the protection of the natural environment.  
In 1986, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) also declared the right 
to development an inalienable human right.20 Six years later, the Rio Declaration 
connected these two elements as it states that “the right to development must be 
fulfilled so as to equitably meet the developmental and environmental needs for 
the present and future generation.” 21 And presently, over 60 state constitutions 
contain specific provisions to protect the natural environment22 establishing the 
right of every person to a safe and healthy environment. Bizkaia Declaration also 
adds that everyone has the right, individually or in association with others, to 
enjoy a healthy and ecologically balanced environment… which may be 
exercised before public bodies and private entities, whatever their legal status 
under national or international law. To enhance the protection for the natural 
environment, all states are asked to include protective measures in both law and 
practice on sub-national, national, regional and international levels.  
But is a stone unturned? Even if states adequately protect their natural 
environment in peacetime, the life of a state is split in two.  Generally, it is 
agreed that in peacetime the protection of the natural environment is emerging as 
a customary state practice. States do not seem to tolerate environmental 
degradation at the expense of another state. In reality, the “no harm” principle 
holds a firm position in environmental law and the polluter pays principle (PPP) 
is often recognized with escalating moral and legal considerations toward the 
future generations.  
                                              
19 United Nations (1948): “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Article 25 [online]. 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml (retrieved 8 May 2010).  
20 Declaration on the Right to Development (1986): Adopted by General Assembly resolution 41/128 of 4 December 
21 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED 1992): Rio Declaration. Principle 3. Earth 
Summit: Rio de Janeiro. 19th plenary meeting.  
22 Giorgetta, Sueli. (2002:181): “The Right to a Healthy Environment, Human Rights and Sustainable Development. 
International Environmental Agreements.” Politics, Law and Economics 2.Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers.  
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In support of such aims, several instruments are encouraged in peacetime as 
precautionary measures to prevent or reduce environmental harm. Some 
instruments are environmental impact assessments (EIA), intrastate and interstate 
notifications, consultations and negotiations. On the other hand, however, how is 
the natural environment adequately protected in wartime? 
Karen Hulme claims that the protection of the natural environment during 
wartime under environmental law is unclear and that any damages must be 
examined on a case-by-case basis.23 Eric Jensen adds that although there are 
more than 900 treaties which provide legal provisions dealing with 
environmental protection, “none attempt to create an integrated approach to 
environmental warfare regulation.”24 
Irrefutably, environments of war pose a serious threat to human beings and the 
natural environment. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that in order to 
construct a reliable framework toward the attainment of sustainable development 
– one must scrutinize whatever might destroy it or stand in the way to protect it. 
Bauman believed that the notion of “creation and destruction are inseparable 
aspects of every civilization.”25 However, civilization in this day and age is often 
expected to be in accordance with international law, even in wartime.  
Overall, if limitations upon the destruction of the natural environment are not 
clearly recognized, respected and enforced in both peacetime and wartime, then 
conceivably, it might be time to reconsider the notion of SD. For according to its 
harshest critics, it simply might not have the necessary means in order to ever be 
realized. Decades ago, it was Freud’s conviction: 
We have given the answer already by pointing to the three sources from which our 
suffering comes: the superior power of nature, the feebleness of our own bodies and 
                                              
23 Harvard Online (2010): “The Protection of the Environment in the event of armed conflict: Military or civilian 
Asset.” 15 July. 
24 Jensen, Eric T. (2005:155): “The International Law of Environmental Warfare: Active and Passive Damage 
During Armed Conflict.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.38:145. 
25 Schech, S.and Haggis, J. (2000:58): “Culture and Development. A Critical Introduction.” Blackwell Publishing.  
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the inadequacy of the regulations which adjust the mutual relationships of human 
beings in the family, the state and society.26 
2.2 The Natural Environment in Wartime 
 
The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE)27 
initiated a common vision to strengthen environmental protection for the 
international community as a whole. However, its widespread categories which 
aim to identify the environment seem to give the impression that it incorporates 
just about everything. In order to truly ascertain protection for the natural 
environment in wartime, it seems the first challenge is to define the term 
“environment.” 
Stockholm Declaration seems to reinforce this point as it highlights an 
identification of the human environment, natural environment, living 
environment, working environment, earthly environment, and world 
environment.28 Inside these all-inclusive packages of environmental concern, it 
seems that the notion of an environment is rendered indistinctive, and therefore, 
the ability to protect it during hostilities presents a rather curious task. 
Nevertheless, some distinctions may be deduced. 
Narrowing focus, international humanitarian law pinpoints two types of 
environment. The first environment is called the man-made. In the event of an 
armed conflict, the man-made environment has particular aspects which receive 
explicit mention and protection under the shield international law.  
Additionally, IHL offers combatants a means for the identification of these 
particular man-made aspects or objects to be respected and protected during 
hostilities. Enshrined in the main legal texts of the Geneva Conventions of August 
                                              
26 Freud, Sigmund. (1961:37): Civilization and its Discontents. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
(emphasis mine) 
27 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972): Stockholm  Declaration  
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12 1949 (GC) and its Additional Protocols of 1977(AP), the following are 
provided a special protection status and are thus, identified in wartime through 
the use of a distinctive emblem, for instance:  hospitals, schools, places of 
worship, museums, cultural objects, works of art, public-service buildings, dams 
and dykes, nuclear power plants and other related infrastructures.29 Without a 
shred of doubt, there are aspects of the man-made environment which are clearly 
being identified as an area of protective concern.  
In addition, there are some operational channels within the man-made 
environment that are also to be respected and protected. Special objects and 
related personnel of this special protection that are being identified to assist these 
humanitarian operations are: medical equipment, medical supplies and personnel, 
religious or spiritual personnel, journalist, transportation vehicles and more. 
Although these tangible and intangible considerations are vital links toward the 
overall attainment of sustainable development, the main interest herein is the 
natural environment in wartime. Is it adequately protected?  
In short, the natural environment is given some mention within IHL; however, 
the protection it receives is pale by comparison with the man-made environment. 
Point in fact; the Geneva Convention never mentions the term natural 
environment – not even once. With its universal influence, these four treaties 
comprising over 400 legal provisions could extend some protection to the natural 
environment in wartime; however, its protection is merely indirect.  Methods of 
indirect protection implies that it does not explicitly mention that the natural 
environment must be protected, however, through other forms of protection, the 
natural environment may still be spared from harm.                                                                      
The direct protection and hence, explicit mention for the protection of the 
natural environment in wartime began in 1977. Within Additional Protocol I 
                                                                                                                                    
28 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972): Stockholm  Declaration  
29 The Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949 and its Additional Protocols 1977  
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(API), there are 102 legal provisions and two of these are being dedicated toward 
protection of the natural environment. Although these two provisions are limited 
in scope and often disregarded as vague, the main point is that the natural 
environment is now formally identified as an object of special consideration in an 
armed conflict.  
The formal inclusion of protection for the natural environment is an important 
development in IHL for the reason that primarily the law of war has been 
designed to protect the human person from unnecessary suffering. Clearly there 
is vital link between humanity and the natural environment being recognized on 
the battlefield. It is puzzling though to see, what the natural environment is. 
What particular aspects of the natural environment are being officially protected 
under international law? How might combatants and military command identify 
and protect the natural environment to make rational targeting decisions and to 
act in accordance with IHL rules and principles? These questions will be further 
expanded upon throughout the thesis. 
The question “what is the natural environment?” was presented to a panel of 
environmental and legal experts.  In response, Hulme claims that there is nothing 
within the interpretation of environmental law that defines what an environment 
actually ‘is’, and therefore – there is no formal working definition.30 In addition, 
she claims that the concept of the natural environment is not really a strong 
consideration for either military command or IHL lawyers. As some concern 
amid the forum brewed, another issue to address became “how military 
command might recognize natural environments in need of special protection? 
The reply, historically, military command does not generally consider the 
environment.31  
                                              
30 Hulme, Karen. (2010): “The Protection of the Environment in the event of armed conflict: Military or Civilian 
Asset.” Harvard Online Seminar. 15 July. 
31 Hulme, Karen. (2010): “The Protection of the Environment in the event of armed conflict: Military or Civilian 
Asset.” Harvard Online Seminar. 15 July. 
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Without a clear and common understanding defining what the natural 
environment is, an argument was presented that this vagueness could lead to 
interpretative disagreements over what qualifies an environment32 and as such, 
ultimately, the law might fail in its protective aim. Hulme adds, “I don't think 
military commanders really sit down and worry about the definition of the 
environment. If it’s got four legs and is running around, it's the environment.”33   
Upon the noticeable lack of a formal working definition it seems fair to propose 
that interpretative challenges may arise. Hence, this terminological vagueness 
could cast doubt with respect to environmental identification, targeting decisions, 
weaponry selection, and the overall application of the law. Such a degree of 
uncertainty leaves an important matter of concern as these perceptions and 
considerations are connected to a series of calculation decisions which determine 
the legal threshold of permissible harm inflicted upon the natural environment.                          
…the terminologies presently used to distinguish types of internal war vary greatly, are 
generally ambiguous, often define overlapping phenomena, or phenomena difficult to 
distinguish in practice, and rarely based on clearly discernible analytical needs. For few 
phenomena do social science, history, and conventional language offer so various and 
vague a vocabulary....34 
 
In light of mounting evidence which demonstrates severe environmental harm 
upon past and present battlefields, obstacles of vague language and its 
subsequent interpretative disagreements shall be examined in the upcoming 
collective case study. In an attempt to ‘square the environment’ we shall examine 
ways in which the natural environment has been directly targeted, deliberately 
manipulated and perhaps unnecessarily injured from declared unintended or 
unforeseen consequences.  
                                              
32 Modirzadeh, Naz. (2010): “The Protection of the Environment in the event of armed conflict: Military or Civilian 
Asset.” Harvard Online Seminar. 15 July.  
33 Hulme, Karen. (2010): “The Protection of the Environment in the event of armed conflict: Military or Civilian 
Asset.” Harvard Online Seminar. 15 July. 
34 (Eckstein, repr. 1972:11) Schmidt, Alex P:  Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention 
Terms (Abridged Version). Sythesis Foundation. Erasmus University (May 1998) edited by Sanam B. Anderlini for 
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Alex Schmidt upholds that “to minimize this confusion and bring greater 
analytical clarity it is important to provide distinct definitions for terms.”35 
Echoing the point, Hobbes believes that “to construct a science we must choose 
our definitions aptly.”                                            
The first use of names is to serve for marks, or notes of remembrance. Another is when 
many use the same words to signify (by their connexion and order) one to another,  
what they conceive or think of each matter, and also what they desire, fear, or have any 
other passion for. Secondly is to show to others that knowledge which we have 
attained, which is to counsel and teach one another. Thirdly, to make known to others 
our wills and purposes, that we may have the mutual help of one another.36  
 
In an attempt to establish this note of remembrance, Jensen claims that a vivid 
definition of the environment is found within the United Nations Convention on 
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques 1976, otherwise known as the ENMOD Convention. 
ENMOD defines the environment as: “the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, 
hydrosphere and atmosphere or . . . outer space.”37 Seemingly an impractical 
match, Jensen believes that this definition lacks clarity which makes it difficult to 
provide adequate protection. 
Another scholar defines the environment as “anything that is not man-made.”38 
He argues that “the only reason for defining the environment and environmental 
damage more explicitly would be an attempt to place an absolute limitation on 
environmental damage which cannot be exceeded by a military commander.”39 
Although he upholds that strict limitations are unnecessary, in contrast, it should 
be a red flag signaling that a formal working definition is a vital link in the 
protection of the natural environment in wartime, and therefore, a significant 
concern toward the attainment of sustainable development.  
                                              
35 Schmidt, Alex P. Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms (Abridged Version). 
Sythesis Foundation. Erasmus University (May 1998) edited by Sanam B. Anderlini for FEWER. (emphasis mine) 
36 Hobbes, Thomas (1994:16-17):  Leviathan, with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668. Edited with 
Introduction by Edwin Curley.Canada: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. (emphasis mine) 
37 Jensen, Eric T. (2005:150): “The International Law of Environmental Warfare: Active and Passive Damage 
During Armed Conflict.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. Vol.38:145  
38 Jensen, Eric T. (2005:150): “The International Law of Environmental Warfare: Active and Passive Damage 
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With more digging for terminological support, a seemingly practical definition 
for the natural environment has been unearthed. Within The Dictionary of the 
International Law of Armed Conflict, published in 1984, I discovered a definition 
of the natural environment purposely designed to be applied in an armed conflict 
context. Distinguished military commander, General Pietro Verri considered 
“admirably qualified to write such a work”40 defined the natural environment as: 
The physical, chemical, and biological conditions that make possible and propitious to 
the life of living creatures. It is prohibited to use methods and means of warfare which 
are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to 
the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the 
population. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are also 
prohibited. (MB. 1982 Part XII, Art. 225; UN 1976; PI Arts. 35, 55; UN 1982Art. 20)41 
 
 In black and white, plainly published by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Red Crescent and Red Crystal (ICRC), the official custodian of 
international humanitarian law (IHL), might the above-mentioned become the 
formal working definition once suspected missing? To improve protection for the 
natural environment could these physical, chemical, and biological elements 
provide a means for the practical assessment of environmental damage and 
therefore, set forth specific variables to properly calculate and define the 
threshold of permissible harm?  
It seems pertinent that the notion of terminological precision with respect to the 
natural environment is in need of further research and discussion. Although it is 
presently argued that the definitional imprecision may serve to provide broader 
coverage of environmental protection,42 evidence based on the collective case 
study herein seems to demonstrate otherwise.  
                                                                                                                                    
39 Jensen, Eric T. (2005:150): “The International Law of Environmental Warfare: Active and Passive Damage 
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40 Verri, Pietro.(1992:5): ICRC Dictionary of the International Law of Armed Conflict. Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC.  
41 Verri, Pietro.(1992:46): ICRC Dictionary of the International Law of Armed Conflict. Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC. 
42 Jensen, Eric T. (2005): “The International Law of Environmental Warfare: Active and Passive Damage During 
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The protection of the natural environment in wartime is plagued with ambiguity 
for various reasons. Clarification and consensus toward a formally acknowledged 
working definition seems to be a vital link in order to enhance its protection. 
Furthermore, unlike its man-made counterpart which is provided with a means of 
clear identification and protection through the use of special statuses and 
distinctive emblems, the natural environment does not have a comparable “road 
map” for neither its identification nor protection in wartime. Nevertheless, even 
if explicit wording of such a rule may be relatively straightforward its practical 
consequences may be greatly disputed by negotiating parties.43 In the event a 
dispute should arise, Our Common Future advises nations to reconsider: 
Many of the environment and development problems that confront us have their 
roots in this sectoral fragmentation of responsibility. Sustainable development 
requires that such fragmentation be overcome.44 
 
≈ 
They must seek security through co-operation, agreements, and mutual restraint; 
they must seek common security. Hence interdependence, which is so fundamental 
in the realm of environment and economics, is a fact also in the sphere of arms 
competition and military security. Interdependence has become a compelling fact, 
forcing nations to reconcile their approach to “security”.45 
                                              
43 SUM Program (2009:191): Development studies compendium. Oslo, Norway: University of Oslo. 
44 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987:63: Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press.(emphasis mine) 
45 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987:295): Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.(emphasis mine) 
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3. Collective Case Study: War, Environmental 
Damage and Legal Considerations 
3.1 The Vietnam War  
Comparable to the crime of war known as genocide, which throughout history 
has deliberately taken the lives of millions of innocent men, women and children 
across divergent nations and ethnic backgrounds ostracized often as the other, it 
was the Vietnam War (1961-1975) which provoked a new crime called ecocide. 
Earning its sinister reputation, Jeffery McNeely describes ecocide as “destruction 
of the environment for military purposes.”46 Similarly while also proposing an 
international agreement to ban widespread environmental destruction; Professor 
Arthur W. Galston defines ecocide as “willful destruction of the environment.”47  
Sometimes silently, the willful destruction of the environment can strike at the 
heart of a nation and its people through various means and methods. For 
instance, amid some totalitarian cultures the deadly link between ecocide and 
genocide has shocked the ecological conscience numerous times. From decades 
of assorted poisons used threatening the food chain as well as other forms of 
environmental abuse in Russia, to China’s nuclear dumping grounds as well as 
various knock-on effects from deforestation, starvation, and endangered species 
hunted in Tibet, the ecological balance is shifting and imposing fatal effects 
through inescapable webs of life. 
The callousness of wartime tells a frightening story. Yet sometimes the brunt 
force of more pronounced battleground transcends silent whispers of affliction. 
For instance, the Vietnam War began as a superpower assisted military training 
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to the South Vietnamese which turned into a battlefield of fierce tactics, claims 
Hulme. 48  In attempts to outsmart and triumph over the Viet-Cong, it is has been 
mentioned that the United States of America (US) used questionable methods 
and means to achieve its military plan in political opposition to communism. 49 It 
was ideological postures and military activities which caused environmental 
damage that until now plague the land and civilian population, nearly four 
decades later. Based on the testimony from some civilians and combatants – the 
war has never ended.  
It is impossible to emphasize in great detail the widespread concerns from the 
environmental destruction. Yet it strikes a sensible chord that if the natural 
environment was not protected by the most destructive military activities under 
international law, then likely damage of a lesser degree might receive a similar 
fate. Thus, it is the most striking matters of environmental destruction that shall 
be analyzed herein, without losing sight of the contemporary aspirations for 
sustainable development. Primarily, the use of chemical herbicides, napalm and 
environmental modification techniques (EMT) are setting off the loudest alarm.   
Besides eight million tons of bombs dropped on Vietnam, US armed forces 
ruined nearly 20,000km² forests and cultivatable land with chemical herbicides. 
Virtually 77,000,000 liters of dioxin-containing defoliants known as Agent 
Orange, Agent Blue and Agent White were sprayed on landscapes in order to kill 
vegetation and unveil camouflaged enemies.50 According to epidemiologist 
Richard Clapp, dioxins are the worst toxins on the planet as he refers to them as 
the “Darth Vader of toxic chemicals.”51  
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 Albeit deadly chemical cocktails, the US Air Force launched a defoliation 
campaign using a dioxin containing substance code-named Agent Purple in 
South Vietnam. Yet researchers established that the most effective formulation 
was a 50/50 blend of 2,4-dicholoropheno-xyacetic acid (2,4-D) and 2,4,5-
tricholorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4,5-T), later branded as Agent Orange.52A 
Northern Vietnam solider, Nguyen Van Quy recalls the caustic odor as it rained 
along the Ho Chi Minh trail, stating that the smell was a sign that Agent Orange 
had “killed all life, down to the roots of plants that hungry soldiers ate”.53  
Despite the claim that US military objectives were to kill plants and deny food 
and ground cover to the National Liberation Front, these particular methods and 
means ultimately challenged the notion of widespread, long-term and severe 
damage, and in due course, summoned states to rethink limitations on 
permissible destruction of the natural environment in wartime.  
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) calculated nearly 55 
thousand tons of chemicals deployed in Vietnam, with approximately 86 percent 
of spraying missions directed against forest and other woody vegetation.  The 
remaining 14 percent was directed against crops.54 As intended, the food and 
camouflage was denied, but with longer-term considerations from the use of 
poisonous tactics other disproportionate and indiscriminate effects transpired. 
For it was these military activities which not only generated dead trees, stripped 
vegetations, contaminated waters, and polluted soils, but it was also their side-
effects which maimed innocent civilians for generations. Hulme adds that the 
natural and human environments suffered long-term contamination, loss of forest 
habitat, and wildlife, widespread mutations, birth defects, cancers and death.55 In 
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fact, scientists claim that there is no way of telling how many future generations 
may become affected by the genetic damage.  
These military activities are viewed so severe that until now unimaginable 
deformities and intergenerational hardships remain. It was teratogenic and 
carcinogenic properties within the dioxin-blended contamination that indicate a 
potential linkage. In theory, it has been set forth as some evidence suggests that 
these poisonous chemicals bled into the soil, the water and then ultimately, the 
food chain. Subsequently, the poisonous foods passed from the mother to her 
developing fetus, causing genetic disorders within the next generation– and the 
next, and so on.                              
The magnitude of the trauma generated by the events that are affecting our world 
exact a toll on families, communities, and entire populations. Trauma can be self-
perpetuating. Trauma begets trauma, and will continue to do so, eventually crossing 
generations in families, communities and countries until we take steps to contain its 
propagation.56 
 
It is estimated that approximately 500,000 children have been born with 
deformities since the 1960s. The exact number of those suffered is unknown. 
Third generation victims remain afflicted by the widespread, long-term and 
severe environmental impacts potentially causing cancer, miscarriages, ovarian 
tumors, prostrate tumors, spina bifida, Down syndrome, Hodgkin disease, 
retardation and other grim physical deformations. Perhaps these deplorable 
outcomes reveal the justification as Rio Declaration Principle 24 affirms:              
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore 
respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed 
conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary.57 
 
The respect for international law is expressed and upheld by states through treaty 
and customary law. However, it also involves an examination of the particular 
laws applicable at that time – it is not retroactive. Indeed the widespread, long-
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term and severe environmental damage caused during Vietnam isolated the 
natural environment as a separate legal theme going forward.58 Be that as it may, 
during that period in wartime history as the environment was being deliberately 
targeted and manipulated– how was the natural environment being protected 
under international humanitarian law (IHL)?  
Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile 
activities. The genetic viability on the earth shall not be compromised; the population 
levels of all life forms, wild and domesticated, must be at least sufficient for their 
survival, and to this end necessary habitats shall be safeguarded.59 
Since the Vietnam War led to the development of Protocols Additional to the 
Geneva Convention (AP), these supplementary legal provisions are not 
applicable in this case. Therefore, it is embedded within earlier treaty 
agreements, wartime legal principles, specific conventions and customary law 
that the search for environmental protection begins. In sync with the legal 
timeline, there a handful of rudimentary laws that may be invoked with respect to 
these aforesaid environmental harms. Yet, were these laws considered adequate 
to protect? 
Predecessor to The Hague Conventions 1899 and 190760, the 1868 St. Petersburg 
Declaration set forth an international treaty agreement which established strict 
limitations on certain weapons. At that time through the support of 20 States 
Parties61 and nowadays as part of customary international law, the use of “arms, 
projectiles and material of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering”62 is clearly 
forbidden. The law states that “the only legitimate object which states should 
endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military force of the 
enemy.”63 It also expressly states that “the necessities of war ought to yield to the 
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requirements of humanity”64 and that “progress of civilization should have the 
effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war.”65 Although there 
is a balancing test that must be considered between the notion of military 
necessity and humanitarian concerns. 
All the same, in the case of Vietnam the application and adherence of these 
customary rules are strikingly peculiar. Not only had the ancient taboo of poison 
slipped through cracks of criminal responsibility, but also napalm seemingly 
failed to be legally considered as a material of a nature to cause unnecessary 
suffering. Although the St. Petersburg Declaration renounces as a matter of 
custom the use of projectiles “either explosive or charged with fulminating or 
inflammable substances,”66  the comparable use of an incendiary weapon 
composed of gasoline jelly,67 otherwise known as napalm was extensively used 
by US armed forces. In fact, this vile fulminating concoction contains an igniting 
agent called white phosphorous which attaches itself to human skin blistering 
through muscle and bone rendering fifth-degree burns in numerous cases. Its use 
inflicts suffering to a degree claimed to be so painful and traumatic as to cause 
death. By comparison to the inhumane Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight68banned through the St. Petersburg Declaration, it is striking 
that chemical herbicides and napalm were not equally considered inhumane 
holding perpetrators accountable on both legal and moral grounds. In sum, the 
force of customary international law (CIL) was not adequate to protect the 
natural environment or humanity in this case. 
Indeed, these military activities deeply concerned other states and motivated 
liberal developments in international law. Although post-factum, an official 
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prohibition of incendiary weapons was later expressed in the 1980 Convention on 
the Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate 
Effects (CCW).69 CCW Protocol III is considered as advancement toward   
environmental protection in wartime as it prohibits and restricts the use of 
incendiary weapons on forests or other kinds of plant cover. One notable 
weakness, however, is that it has an exception clause whereas military necessity 
can legally override the humanity principle.  
It is prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by 
incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal, 
or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military 
objectives.70 
 
The Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention also offer applicable 
laws in the case of Vietnam. In the 1907 Hague Convention, in which the US 
ratified in 1909, Article 22 states:  
The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.71 It 
especially forbids: to employ poison or poisoned weapons; to kill or wound 
treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; to employ arms, 
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; to destroy or seize 
the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded 
by the necessities of war.72  
 
Adam Roberts claims that these provisions do have a bearing on the natural 
environment.73  Although they were considered important in this case, oddly 
enough, it seems the concept of poison was not well-defined.74 It was upheld that 
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the random poisoning of a large number of people, if it is a side-effect of the 
deforestation on the battlefield, is neither a crime against humanity, nor a 
violation of any treaty to which the U.S. was a signatory at the time the 
poisoning occurred.  
Another problematic proposal was that Agent Orange should be classified as an 
herbicide, not as a poison. 75 This statement was found “unclear and hair-
splitting…as Agent Orange contains dioxin, so if dioxin is a poison shouldn’t 
Agent Orange also be?”76Since the high dosage involved was sufficient to harm 
people, is it believable to expect that it would only harm plants? The military 
objective of targeting plants seemed an escape route for the defense, and thus, 
shielded under national sovereignty – it actually worked.  
Up to now, none of the aforesaid treaties or customary rules was adequate to 
prevent or protect the natural environment from harm. Even the Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of 
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol (GP) 
which outlaws  chemical substances,  was deemed inadequate – regardless of the 
fact that it is claimed to prohibit such employment because of direct toxic effects 
on man, animals or plants.77  Irrefutably, the blatant and extensive use of poison 
or more palatably articulated by the US “herbicide or defoliant” presents one of 
the most gripping tests of international law.  
 Although this legal interpretation with regard to the “direct toxic effects on… 
plants” was put forth in 1969,78 several years following the US defoliation 
campaign, these particular military activities continued. Important to note, the GP 
was not applicable to the US armed forces, and as a matter of treaty law they 
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were not obliged to comply with its terms. In fact, in 1961 Dean Rusk, Secretary 
of State, advised President Kennedy that “the use of defoliant does not violate 
any rule of international law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and is 
an accepted tactic of war.”79 
According to Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District Court ‘even 
if’ the US was a Geneva signatory during the Vietnam War, that the accord 
would not have barred the use of Agent Orange. He claims that "the prohibition 
extended only to gases deployed for their asphyxiating or toxic effects on man, 
not to herbicides designed to affect plants that may have unintended harmful 
side-effects on people."80  
It was not until 1975, when President Ford issued Executive Order 11,850 that 
the use of herbicide was formally renounced “as a matter of national policy.” 
Ford’s accompanying remarks confirmed the consistent position of the US that 
“the 1925 Geneva Protocol does not cover chemical herbicides.”81 Is it possible 
that a reclassification and renaming of one of the most deadly poisons could have 
permitted it legitimate use? Dioxin was merely reduced to an ‘herbicide or 
defoliant’ in conjunction with the added justification that its intended use (or so-
called intended use) was simply to kill plants. These statements imply that 
humanity and the natural environment are unrelated.  
The problem is however that this is not how the natural environment functions. 
The natural environment is a vital link to human wellbeing – and in short, 
environmental harm may likely cause harm to humanity. Recognizing the 
potential danger of harmful substances, the Rio Declaration forewarns: 
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States should effectively cooperate to discourage or prevent the relocation and 
transfer to other States of any activities and substances that cause severe 
environmental degradation or are found to be harmful to human health.82 
 
Not only was a massive amount of fauna killed in Vietnam, but also an 
ecosystem collapse threatened several other species such as the Irrawaddy 
Dolphin, Saurus Crane, Asian Elephant, Giant Ibis, White Shouldered Ibis and 
deer species.83 Military activities disturbed the underground water systems and 
soils through hazardous contamination which also endangered diverse living 
species – some which the civilian population relied upon as a food source. 
However, this food-chain interrelationship is not new evidence. 
In 1926, J.L. Suarez, Rapporteur to the League of Nations Committee of Experts 
for the Progressive Codification of International Law wrote about biological 
solidarity, or what might be called the ecosystem approach to environmental 
protection.84 Suarez had cautioned that “the loss of even a single species might 
have broader environmental effects so as to disturb the balance of the ecosystem 
itself.”85 Referred to as the 'knock-on' effect theory it was pointed out that the 
loss of one species could trigger a series of negative consequences for the 
dependent species along the food chain. As this information is 85 years old, it 
should now be well considered toward the aim of meaningful protection.  
It was not until 1966 when the discovery regarding long-term health effects of 
the pesticides including 2,4,5-T (known as the Bionetics Study) that the US 
government revealed evidence of teratogenicity (birth defects) in mice. Yet this 
information did not immediately limit its military use in Vietnam. 86 In fact, the 
last mission of the US defoliation program concluded in 1971, nearly five years 
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after an awareness of potential harm. Although the Bionetics study revealed 
evidential links of teratogencity found within the lab mice, this causal link was 
not established in the Vietnamese victims’ case from the environmental damage 
inflicted by Agent Orange.  
At the Earth Summit, a precautionary measure was set into motion in order to set 
forth and enhanced measure of protection for the natural environmental going 
forward. It states: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation.87 
 
An estimated one million people have been registered disabled and hundreds of 
thousands dead from the poisonous chemicals, stated the Vietnamese Red Cross. 
Nonetheless, Judge Weinstein had maintained in 2005 that "there is no basis for 
any of the claims of plaintiffs under the domestic law of any nation or state or 
under any form of international law, the case is dismissed."88   
Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Orange (VAVAO), vice president 
Nguyen Trong Nhan believes that "it is a wrong decision, unfair and 
irresponsible."89  William H. Goodman adds “the judge missed the point. He 
ruled as a matter of law that what these defendants manufactured was not a 
poison, whereas even these manufacturers recognized that it was at the time."90  
Sustainability requires the enforcement of wider responsibilities for the impacts of 
decisions. This requires changes in the legal and institutional frameworks that will 
enforce the common interest. Some necessary changes in the legal framework start 
from the environment adequate for health and well-being is essential for all human 
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beings – including future generations.91 
 
Other important laws that were invoked in attempt to enforce protection have 
been enshrined in The Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV)92 ratified by the US in 
1955. Articles 146 and 147 put forth the legal provisions to prohibit and enforce 
the extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly against protected persons or 
property. Article 50 also lists as a grave breach the act of “willfully causing great 
suffering or serious injury to body or health.”93 Yet none of these basic 
provisions seemed to offer adequate protection to the natural environment as a 
matter of civilian or state property, or protect the civilians from severe 
unnecessary suffering – which still persists today.  
As a result, wartime principles of proportionality, distinction or humanity seem 
inadequate. It is mainly argued that no means could be demonstrated to prove 
that the chemical herbicides were intended to harm humans. Without intent, 
proportionality and humanity principles could not be invoked. Plaintiffs’ argued 
that the “defendants were wanton and reckless in producing herbicides which 
they knew contained dioxin and would harm people.”94 The chemical companies 
had the information and yet, intentionally, continued to produce products with 
high concentrations of dioxin which demonstrates foreknowledge and hence, 
intent.95  
In a similar vein, the Nazis’ were also accused of knowing that poisonous Zyklon 
B gas would be used in the concentration camps.96 However, this puts a clear 
attention pinpointing the knowledge and intent of poisonous effects directly onto 
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the human person, not plants. Since that dismal period, The 1945 Nuremberg 
Charter and the 1951 Nuremberg Principles banned war crimes namely, 
violations of the laws and customs of war, including “murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in 
occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the 
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity.”97 Still, the defense had maintained a lack of what I would refer to as 
“environmental intelligence” as the US armed forces’ intention was to kill plants 
only. Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Orange maintains otherwise. 
The US war veterans suffering from the chemical contact received compensation 
amounting to $180m by the chemical manufacturers in 1984 for injuries inflicted. 
Vietnamese victims pursuing similar claims in search of environmental clean-up 
and justice had their case dismissed in 2005. Upon appeal, it was dismissed once 
more. 
Tagged as a war crime against millions, the US Government, Monsanto, Dow 
Chemical, Hercules and other associated parties were not held criminally 
responsible. Dow Chemical lawyer,  Andrew L. Frey, believes that people 
suffering life's random hardships sued because "it's human nature to look for 
something to blame.''98  
Fund for Reconciliation and Development (FRD) Executive Director, John 
McAuliffe affirms that “Judge Weinstein has made it easier for our country to 
continue to evade moral responsibility for the consequences of its actions.  
Regardless of how much chemical companies and the US government knew 
about dioxin contamination when used as a weapon of war, they should not hide 
behind legal and scientific technicalities to avoid obligation in addressing an 
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ongoing human tragedy traceable to their actions.  We constantly hold other 
countries responsible, but never ourselves.” McAuliffe adds, “sadly, this case fits 
a pattern of obstructing diplomacy and justice by invoking an extreme version of 
executive privilege that has no basis in the US Constitution or international law.99  
According to Austin and Bruch, this destruction to the natural environment in 
terms of scale, severity and longevity has led to the first international legal 
provisions to prohibit environmental destruction in wartime: the ENMOD 
Convention and Additional Protocol I.100 Yet with reference to the Vietnam War, 
Bruch claims, in spite of these environmental damages, “there was no attempt to 
establish responsibility, let alone liability.”101 Foreseen as a relational link toward 
Our Common Future, it has been recommended: 
The World Commission on Environment and Development must strike at this 
fundamental problem by recommending specific ways for countries to co-operate to 
surmount sovereignty, to embrace international instruments in order to deal with global 
threats. The growing trend towards isolationism demonstrates that the current rhythm 
of history is out of harmony with human aspirations, even with its chances for 
survival.102 
 
Although troops have withdrawn decades ago, the postwar development burden 
and sorrow permeates the landscapes and its victims left behind. In addition to 
the 4.8 million lives lost to Agent Orange, Vietnam is still attempting to recover 
from severe environmental damage. Poor families sometimes have several 
disabled children who need a lot of care, which presents a huge social, medical 
and economic drain.”103 We have generation after generation suffering from its 
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consequences,'' William H. Goodman maintains.104 Indeed the development 
community has started to take action as organizations and donors have 
coordinated participatory forms of support in the areas of disability, health, 
environment, vocational training and income generation to make explicit their 
inclusion of dioxin-affected families and communities in assistance programs.105 
It has been stated that “participatory development approaches pioneered by 
international NGOs, in cooperation with Vietnamese partners should be extended 
to reach affected populations.” 106  
In light of the above reflections, I believe that IHL was inadequate in the 
protection of the natural environment during the Vietnam War. The case reveals 
how limitations, even those perceived clear-cut and customary, might become 
blurred by different legal interpretations and parties of interest. In addition, it 
demonstrates the weight of legal decisions as a fundamental constituent toward 
the strengthening or weakening of customary protection, the posture amid 
international relations and also, how novel methods and means of warfare can be 
invented where the law is deemed non-existent, for example, the use of 
environmental modification techniques (EMT) as a weapon of war (to be further 
discussed in chapter 4).  
In the next section, the Gulf War (1990-1991) shall be explored in an attempt to 
test the legal adequacy of IHL once more. With added environmental provisions 
inspired by the Vietnam War: is the natural environment adequately protected? 
3.2 The Gulf War 
The Gulf War (1990-91) presents an additional case which makes us reflect upon 
some vital links between international humanitarian law and sustainable 
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development. Although it was the Vietnam War which instigated the crime of 
ecocide, stirring nations to further develop IHL, two decades later; it was the 
Gulf War stirring the concept of an eco-criminal.  
As international concerns toward environmental destruction in wartime were 
escalating, it became clear that a sort of ‘protective package’ was needed. 
Following the experience of the Vietnam War, it was now foreseeable that the 
civilian population, environment and postwar development efforts were 
adversely affected by the widespread, long-term and severe environmental 
damage. The aftermath of the Gulf War highlights a similar call for help as it was 
claimed that “…this war left behind a crippled infrastructure unable to meet the 
needs of a modern society.”107 And so, as other parts of the world aim to solve 
often complex and sometimes straightforward obstacles to achieve sustainable 
development, it is within postwar societies that a heavy burden and added set of 
challenges remain.  Recognizing the unsettling fact that conflict is a cause of 
unsustainable development, it has been stated that: 
Arms competition and armed conflict create major obstacles to sustainable 
development. They make huge claims on scarce material resources. They pre-empt 
human resources and wealth that could be used to combat the collapse of 
environmental support systems, the poverty, and the underdevelopment that in 
combination contribute so much to contemporary political insecurity. They may 
stimulate an ethos that is antagonistic towards co-operation among nations whose 
ecological and economic interdependence requires them to overcome national or 
ideological antipathies.108 
 
During the Gulf War, Iraqi armed forces targeted the natural environment with full 
intent. One of the most alarming attacks was the detonation of roughly 600 oil wells 
which became “engulfed in flames, spewing out thick billows of smoke that turned 
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midday into midnight.”109 The hostile act caused widespread destruction not only to 
the Kuwaiti environment, but also endangered the entire region.  
The smoke generated from the burning oil wells not only polluted the Kuwaiti 
atmosphere, but also created black rain in Iran and Turkey, and perhaps as far east as 
India.110 A danger of global environmental threat loomed, as the smoke plumes were 
climbing to jet-stream heights of 45,000 feet, and that the pollution could then be 
transported around the globe. Rising to more or less 10,000 to 12,000 feet, at most 
22,000 feet,111 US Department of Defense, Lieutenant Colonel John Luce states that “a 
global level environmental disaster from the smoke was averted only by the fortunate 
wind and temperature conditions.”112  
In addition to threatening the world’s atmosphere, the marine environment was also 
targeted. Iraqi forces released nearly 6 to 11 million barrels of crude oil into the Persian 
Gulf in an attempt to clog desalinization plants.113 Oil pipelines were also diverted into 
the sea causing severe harm to marine life. In this region, water currents are claimed to 
typically flow in a counter-clockwise direction, and thus, the oil spills impacted 
primarily the Kuwaiti and Northern Saudi coast.114 This likely explains the 50 to 75 
percent of shorebirds saturated in oil 115 capturing worldwide attention and spawning an 
international outrage. Meanwhile, the damaged oil wells upon the land generated 
numerous “oil lakes” which ultimately threatened to contaminate the underground water 
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table as oil seeped through the desert soil.116 Hulme adds a sense of precaution in this 
regard: 
The damage inflicted upon an ecosystem may not be confinable to that particular 
country or region. To protect a single ecosystem one must work to protect the global 
ecosystem and vice versa.117 
 
As one of the largest oil spills ever created in history, as well as other military activities 
endangering ‘the global ecosystem’– how was the natural environment protected under 
international humanitarian law? Strikingly, in light of all the intentional destruction, 
divergent views remain as to if these Iraqi military activities constituted a violation of 
IHL – for several reasons.  
Prior to the conflict escalation, Hussein threatened to attack the Kuwaiti oil fields if 
coalition forces got involved. Shortly afterward on January 17, 1991, the coalition 
forces started an air campaign in an attempt to defend the territory of Kuwait and put an 
end to Iraq’s unlawful invasion.  For that reason, Hussein ordered the detonation of 
1250 oil wells118 even though the Charter of the United Nations states:  
Recalling that every State has the duty, in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations, to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.119 
 
Some IHL analysts argue that the oil wells could have been used a legitimate military 
objective. The huge amounts of oil-fire smoke could have been a means to “impede the 
vision of the allied forces.”120  Provided that air support, reconnaissance flights and 
satellite imagery were adversely impacted121 by the smoke screen, Hussein achieved his 
objective. However, this perspective suggests that the action was a military necessity 
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and as such, the harm to the natural environment was purely “collateral damage.” 
Nevertheless, according to coalition forces this argument did not hold. 
Coalition forces stated that Hussein merely acted upon a threat “to spite the 
international community.”122 According to the US Senate Gulf Pollution Task Force, 
“Iraq's actions were not supportable by military necessity.” 123 To be considered a 
legitimate military objective, the burning of the oil wells needed to offer a definite 
military advantage.  
In view of the fact that the oil wells were located on the ‘occupied territory’ of Kuwait, 
and seeing the Iraqi forces withdrawing as the defeated enemy, Dinstein claims that the 
“systematic destruction could not have possibly affected the progress of the war…and 
as such, did not offer a definite military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the 
time.”124 He emphasizes that “'scorched earth' policy is permitted to retreating troops 
only when the area affected belongs to the belligerent party, and not to the enemy.”125 
With consideration regarding the excessive injury to the environment and civilian 
population from the “monstrous air pollution,” Dinstein maintains that the oil-well fires 
constituted a breach in the proportionality principle.126   
It is commonly agreed that Iraq violated treaty law and customary international law. 
The fundamental principles of military necessity and proportionality have been claimed 
as violations given that the only acts permitted in wartime are those that are 
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“proportional to the lawful objective of the military operations and actually necessary to 
achieve that objective.”127   
Iraq allegedly also violated the 1907 Hague Regulation, Article 23(g), as it prohibits the 
destruction or seizure of the enemy's property, unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.128 Geneva Convention IV, Article 53 
also forbids the destruction by an Occupying Power of both private and public property 
within an occupied territory, except where such destruction is rendered absolutely 
necessary by military operations.129  And Article 147 lists the ‘extensive destruction...of 
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly as 
a grave breach of IHL.130   
Michael Schmidt asks, “Can the land, water supplies, animals or crops be reasonably 
argued as property?”  What about Kuwait’s air contaminated by oil fires, or the stocks 
of fish or migratory birds which suffered from the oil spill?  Is the air, fish or migratory 
birds considered property of Kuwait?”131 These are some reasonable considerations 
while attempting to assess where the line is (or should be) drawn regarding the 
extensive destruction of a State’s property from an environmental viewpoint.  
When an oil refinery is struck, this may give rise to toxic air pollution. When an oil 
storage facility is demolished, the oil may seep into the ground and poison water 
resources. When an oil tanker is sunk at sea, the resultant oil spill may be devastating 
for marine life.132 
 
Is it possible that the natural environment was protected under the 1976 United Nations 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (the ENMOD Convention)? According to the Second Review 
Conference, the intentional detonation of hundreds of oil wells was indeed considered a 
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hostile act which met all three criteria of widespread, long-lasting or severe damage as 
understood under Article I of the Convention.133 Despite that it is still claimed not 
enough to make the ENMOD Convention applicable to Iraq for two reasons: 
1) Iraq is not party to ENMOD, and hence cannot be found in breach from a legal perspective  
2) The act of setting fire to oil wells remains questionable as to if it would qualify as an environmental 
modification technique (EMT)134 
 
While Iraqi military actions reignited interest in the ENMOD Convention, scholars 
reconsidered the practical application of the law. Amid the discussion, it was suggested 
that as an ENMOD signatory, Iraq was under an “obligation to refrain from such acts 
which defeat the object and purpose of the Convention.”135 Be that as it may, it was 
considered inadequate to hold Iraq liable for the environmental damage.  
Secondly, on the subject of the burning oil wells satisfying the environmental 
modification technique criteria there have been mixed views. It is arguable that the 
action could meet the criteria as a modification technique considering that the oil fires 
upset the ecological balance of the region and changed weather patterns as listed within 
the illustrative phenomena under Article II.136 The trouble with the EMT qualification is 
regarding the element “deliberate manipulation of natural processes.” On the one hand, 
it has been asserted that setting oil wells afire is not a deliberate manipulation of natural 
processes; however, on the other hand, the massive oil fires did “manipulate” at least 
one natural process – photosynthesis. As thick layers of soot hovering in the atmosphere 
could feasibly block the rays of the sun adversely impacting plant growth.137  
Overall, it is upheld that Iraqi military activities did not violate the ENMOD 
Convention however, possibly violated Additional Protocol I (API) because of intended 
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or may be expected elements of the widespread, long-term and severe damage. Indeed, 
the intended element is evident, though, the long-term requirement to meet the 
widespread, long-term and severe (WLS) threshold was not satisfied. Although 
scientists initially predicted long-term catastrophic consequences to the natural 
environment, “the desert ecosystem (which includes the marine environment) had 
proven to be remarkably resilient.”138 Accordingly, it is argued that WLS threshold of 
harm is too high. 
Regardless of the varying arguments, Iraq was not a contracting Party to API, and thus, 
not duty-bound. Dinstein had considered the most intriguing question under IHL to be if 
the oil fires constituted a breach of ENMOD and API, he concludes – “The simple 
answer is negative.”139 
Even though the Gulf War may have seen the most severe wartime environmental 
damage in history, it is unclear whether either ENMOD or API applied: Iraq had not 
ratified ENMOD and had neither signed or ratified API. The Security Council could 
have argued, but did not, that the relevant norms of these conventions reflected 
customary international law, and thus the entire international community - including 
Iraq - was bound by the provisions. The Security Council’s silence on the matter did 
little to affirm the treaties strength.140 
 
Maintaining a balanced view, however, Iraq was not the only belligerent in question. It 
seems important to highlight that the coalition forces also had a severe impact on the 
environment. Iraqi nuclear facilities, industrial production facilities, chemical facilities, 
as well as water and sanitation infrastructures141 were all selected targets as military 
objectives.  
It is alleged that the battlefield became like a toxic soup. The UK and US fired 
relatively 320 tons of depleted uranium (DU) ammunition, which upon hitting hard 
targets causes a release of radioactive dust. The gravest threat is that the radioactive 
dust can possibly enter into the air, soil and water causing severe, long-term, and 
                                              
138 Brauer, Jurgen.(2000:11): “The Effect of War on the Natural Environment.” Augusta State University. 
139 Dinstein, Yoram (2004:193): The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict. United 
States: Cambridge University Press. 
140 Environmental Law Institute. (1998:7): Addressing Environmental Consequences of War. First International 
Conference on Addressing Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic, and Scientific Perspectives. 
Research Report. Washington D.C. 10-12 June. 
141 Brauer, Jurgen. (2000:12): “The Effect of War on the Natural Environment.”Augusta State University. 
 49
possibly transboundary harm; the duration of DU is estimated to be 4.5 billion years. 
The US and its coalition forces did not face any charges.142 Further research on the 
reason for their dismissal is still needed.  
These new instruments of international law that were motivated by the devastating 
effects of the Vietnam War, the ENMOD Convention and Additional Protocol I, 
seemed unable to protect the natural environment throughout the Gulf War. There are 
even more considerations and challenges which highlight the inadequacies toward the 
protection of the natural environment in a wartime context. While attempting to 
establish the extent of environmental damage, it seems that other issues are imposing a 
setback in the ability to enforce environmental protection. Some of the top concerns are 
a lack of environmental baseline data, valuation methodologies, and the ability to 
pinpoint liability matters. In addition, it seemed important to rethink how these legal 
mechanisms can be made to function in order to gain respect of the international 
community.143  
Regardless of these added complexities, the international response sent a clear message. 
In a ‘civilized’ world, this extent of destruction unto the natural environment should be 
considered unacceptable and punishable under international law. This position is upheld 
in view of the fact that although IHL was deemed inadequate in the protection of the 
natural environment, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security 
Council held Iraq liable by the adoption of Resolution 687. Jensen states that “this 
could set the legal precedent for future armed conflicts.”144 In addition, Kuwait filed 
claims concerning the damage to its natural resources, such as lost oil, damaged 
fisheries, business losses and related public health concerns.145 The United Nations 
Compensation Commission (UNCC) was also established to settle these claims based 
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on a trust fund created by Iraq’s frozen international assets and oil export revenues. The 
asserted value of these claims amounted to $250 billion.146 As the Stockholm 
Declarations sets forth: 
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage caused by 
activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction.147 
 
 
All in all, it is claimed that Iraq still suffers not only from the sobering realities 
from its own government, but also from the added burdens imposed upon it from 
the international community. Brauer claims that it is the “people carrying the 
brunt of the punishment in the form of economic sanctions, frozen assets, 
reparation payments, and consequent economic disaster imposed on Iraq.”148  
Although the legal framework of international humanitarian law has compliance 
mechanism in position to ensure the respect of wartime rules and principles, 
commonly referred to as Protecting Powers, it did not prompt countermeasures 
by other States Parties, either individually or collectively. In the end, it appears 
that IHL did not offer protection to the natural environment in this case, and 
hence, seems inadequate to protect this fundamental component of sustainable 
development. According to Dinstein: 
…the wrongful act which has engaged Iraq's State responsibility under international 
law for any environmental damage on the illegal invasion of Kuwait in breach of the 
UN Charter and customary international law, rather than on law of international armed 
conflict. In other words, Iraq's obligation to pay compensation for environmental 
damage (in conformity with Resolution 687) was derived from a flagrant violation of 
the jus ad bellum and not from any possible breach of the jus in bello.149 
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3.3 The Kosovo Conflict  
Prior to the 1999 Kosovo conflict, the protection of the natural environment was 
a basic obligation for all States in wartime. Its formal consideration had been 
accepted as custom into the corpus of international law. Driven by recognition of 
ecocides and eco-criminals a piecemeal approach was taken to enhance 
protection of the natural environment from anthropocentric and biocentric 
viewpoints. However, shortly after the Gulf War, within the past decade or so, 
another ecological devastation occurred. Once again, the world observed, and 
strong concerns were raised regarding Serbian armed forces and NATO military 
activities as well as present legal obligations to respect the natural environment 
during hostilities. Upon entering the 21st century, was IHL adequate? 
During the Kosovo air campaign, the then present legal regime was claimed to 
become eroded. 150 Even though military command was required to offer due 
consideration to the natural environment, NATO forces signalled the ‘green 
light’ to heavily target an industrialized country. In a sequence of targeting 
decisions upon oil refineries, industrial product storage facilities, and 
petrochemical sites, in addition to, the controversial use of depleted uranium 
(DU) munitions, the conflict earned a title as a “low intensity nuclear war.” 
However, the series of high-altitude bombings also triggered something else – 
severe criticism. As Bruch states:  
NATO deliberately attacked environmentally sensitive targets despite the obvious 
prospect of serious pollution of regionally important international waterways and other 
forms of environmental harm.151 
 
Before reviewing the most destructive wartime actions, it seems important to 
highlight that the hostilities began as an internal conflict of “low intensity.” In a 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC) or internal conflict, there is a limited 
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and indirect method of protection available for the natural environment under 
Additional Protocol II (APII). Being considered by some as inadequate, further 
provisions were proposed in order to strengthen environmental protection more 
directly during periods of internal conflict, but the proposal was discarded. 
Nevertheless, the former refusal does not dismiss the threatening reality that even 
belligerents within the territory of their own State might also consider direct 
methods and means of inflicting environmental damage, as formerly highlighted 
regarding the ecocide in Russia and China. 
There are internal matters of violence as Serbian forces and other organized 
armed groups (OAG) deliberately poisoned water wells, and used scorched earth 
tactics to drive the Albanians from their homeland. During hostilities of a non-
international character, customary law and APII is the legal regime applicable 
among the High Contracting Parties (HCP). Within Additional Protocol II, there 
are two provisions enshrined which theoretically present an arguable case to 
consider the adequacy of international humanitarian law. Article 13 is pertinent 
as it aims to provide protection for the civilian population and Article 14 as it 
aims to protect objects indispensible to the civilian population, such as “drinking 
water installations and supplies.”152  
Yet the character of the conflict is not “set in stone.” Taking the decision to halt 
genocide within the Federal Republic of the Former Yugoslavia, NATO forces 
got involved. With NATO’s participation, the conflict shifted from an internal 
conflict to an international armed conflict (IAC) character.  Therefore, the legal 
regime applicable also shifted. Although this shift into an international conflict 
could bring into play one of the strongest set of rules for environmental 
protection in wartime under Additional Protocol I, there are concerns 
surrounding its full and equal application. It is important to note that albeit the 
‘majority’ of NATO member states are contracting Parties to Additional Protocol 
I, France, Turkey and the US were not duty-bound.  
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From its unique position, some of NATO’s military actions received substantial 
attention. The most striking were made during the Kosovo air campaign. NATO 
had clearly made the political decision to use high-altitude bombing despite the 
consequences of its environmentally sensitive targets. However, it was a tactical 
decision and weaponry selection that would not escape backlash.  
Not only were states becoming more involved with protective concerns for the 
natural environment in wartime, but also non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) and the civilian population started to take action. In an attempt to defend 
their territorial integrity, NGOs and average citizens began to detail information 
concerning the environmental damage through monitoring, documenting and 
broadcasting reports of the severe environmental impacts using the Internet and 
media.153 And once more, the legitimacy of IHL and its provisions to protect the 
natural environmental became challenged. As the World Charter for Nature 
declares: 
States are to work co-operatively to safeguard and conserve nature in areas beyond 
national jurisdiction; all persons shall have the opportunity to participate in the 
formulation of decisions of direct concern with their environment and shall have means 
for redress when their environment has suffered damage or degradation.154 
 
During NATO’s 78-day campaign, more than eighty industrial facilities155 were 
bombed. The destruction of the Pancevo petrochemical complex and Novi Sad 
delivered a severe blow to the environment. The initial assessment is that “1,500 
tons of vinyl chloride (a known carcinogen), 15,000 tons of ammonia, 800 tons 
of hydrochloric acid, 250 tons of liquid chlorine, 100 tons of mercury, and 
significant quantities of dioxin (a carcinogenic and mutagenic industrial by-
product that is also found in Agent Orange)” were released.  Consequently, as 
side-effects or collateral damage of these toxic targets, food crops and fish stocks 
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became contaminated by the poisonous gases, miscarriage rates doubled and 
human illnesses increased. To this day the long-term damages to the natural 
environment are unknown. 156 Bruch claims as a precautionary measure that:  
Activities which are likely to pose a significant risk to nature shall be preceded by an 
exhaustive examination; their proponents shall demonstrate that expected benefits 
outweigh potential damage to nature, and where potential adverse effects are not fully 
understood, the activities should not proceed.157 
 
Other than the discharge of the aforesaid toxic substances, NATO’s destruction 
of the petrochemical fertilizer and oil refinery complex released vast amounts of 
oil, gasoline, and an another powerful carcinogen known as dichloride into the 
Danube River.158 A western observer tagged the scene as an “ecological disaster” 
as hazardous pollutants drifted downstream into Romania and next Bulgaria, and 
then eventually into the Black Sea.159 Additional transboundary environmental 
damage was reportedly caused by the destruction of civilian infrastructures such 
as sewage treatment facilities.  
NATO Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary 
General, Dr. Jamie Patrick Shea claims the long-term damage as exaggerations 
on the environmental front. His response during NATO’s press conference used 
the following justification: 
…let's not forget that when our pilots fly over Yugoslavia and see a lot of smoke, the 
smoke is coming from all of these burning villages in Kosovo and if you're talking 
about environmental damage, I think the "scorched earth" policy applied to Kosovo, 
the destruction of livestock, the destruction of rivers and roads and communication 
routes, the destruction of the agriculture, the slaughtering of a large percentage of the 
cattle and the livestock, is going to be much more significant in the long term and 
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incidentally require a lot more money to fix than the repair of some oil refineries.160 
 
Stuck between polar opposite positions, what does international humanitarian 
law add to the debate? One attention-grabbing argument is regarding the 
customary principle of distinction between civilian objects and military 
objectives. NATO was required to strike a balance in this regard while also 
weighing considerations of humanity, and proportionality in conjunction with 
military necessity. 
Franck asserts that the assessment of proportionality in the NATO bombing case 
is a difficult one. The reason specified is that “the accepted interpretation is that 
overall military advantage is considered in the proportionality analysis, not just 
that resulting immediately from the attack.”161 But then, what could be said about 
the targeting of a fertilizer plant as meeting the conditions of military necessity 
and hence, contributing to the overall military advantage?  
According to Hulme, the qualification of Pancevo as a military objective is a 
dubious one.162 She adds that the fertilizer plant supplies products which sustain 
the agricultural sector which cater to possibly both civilian and military purposes, 
and unless the plant was converted to serve “wholly” military use it would fall 
outside the definitional scope provided within API Article 52(2). 163 Dr. Ing. 
Slobodan Tresac, general director of the HIP Petrochemical plant at Pancevo 
reported that the facility was not used for military purposes. If so, the attack 
would be unlawful.164  
Bruch and Austin put forth the argument that since the location of the Pancevo 
complex was only 16km from Belgrade, “it raises some troubling concerns about 
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the very nature of the balancing test.”165 Not only is it unlawful to attack a 
military objective with disproportionate methods or means of warfare, but also 
the risks to the civilian population must be part of the military calculation. It has 
been suggested that although these facilities were indeed civilian infrastructures, 
they may have served a ‘dual-use’ purpose as the facilities also provided gasoline 
and other products to the Serbian armed forces. NATO maintains that “Pancevo 
was considered to be a very, very important refinery and strategic target, as 
important as tactical targets inside Kosovo.”166 Regarding these environmental 
consequences of wartime, Bruch put forth some added reflections on the law of 
war, as he states:   
This remarkable statement underscores the vagueness and inherently manipulability of 
the existing law-of war provisions limiting wartime environmental damage, and the 
difficulty in trying to make them universally applicable. The complex calculations that 
factor into the balancing test cannot, and should not, be reduced to the number of times 
the target's importance is prefixed with the word "very."167 
 
Schmitt maintains that a universal metric does not exist for assessing the weight 
of countervailing interests. As mentioned earlier, the shield of protection that is 
afforded to civilian objects under international humanitarian law may be 
withdrawn if the target is deemed an imperative military necessity. Even though 
NATO forces did perceive these targets as legitimate military objectives, it is 
important to note that the notion of military necessity does not give carte blanche 
to military command. Upon defining a legitimate military objective, the ICRC 
reported that there is a need “to avoid excessive long-term damage to the natural 
environment with consequential adverse effects on the civilian population.” 168 
Regarding Additional Protocol I (API), there are some added reflections which 
challenge the applicability and adequacy of its environmental provisions offering 
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direct protection. Once again, these reflections involve an understanding of the 
widespread, long-term and severe threshold set forth in Articles 35(3) and 55.   
To summon protection, a cumulative “widespread, long-term and severe” 
damage onto the natural environment needs to be ‘proven.’ The first hurdle is 
that these terms ‘widespread’ and ‘severe’ are not defined under API. With 
respect to the  Pancevo and Novi Sad attacks, Bruch and Austin claim that “the 
clouds of toxic chemicals, contaminated waterways, and soiled earth may have 
had and continue to have, severe health and environmental impacts. Some of the 
known contaminants, such as mercury and dioxin, retain their toxicity 
indefinitely and bioaccumulate.”169 If environmental damage can also be proven 
to last for ‘decades’ in order to satisfy the long-term element, and if the 
transboundary effects could be proven to satisfy the widespread element, then 
perhaps, a limitation upon this extent of environmental destruction could be 
established under API and made to constitute a violation of international law in a 
wartime context. The strength in satisfying the widespread, long-term and severe 
threshold resides in the fact that there is no exemption for military necessity. 
Once the threshold is fulfilled, the act is illegal. Yet it is uncertain as to the 
testing of its legal adequacy. As Schmitt recalls, “These provisions have yet to be 
applied in practice.”170  
Another thorny theme to give consideration to is the application of Additional 
Protocol I Article 35(3) and 55, regarding non-contracting Parties in coalition 
forces, for instance, NATO. Even though the majority of NATO member states 
are contracting Parties to Additional Protocol I, and provided that the Kosovo air 
campaign was led by US armed forces, which are not Party to the Protocol – 
which legal regime would be applicable? Further research is still required 
relating to allied forces and rules applicable in the event armed conflict.   
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Under API, some other considerations may be provided to critically assess the 
adequacy of IHL concerning protection of the natural environment. Rewinding 
to the ‘dual-use’ exemption, it has been stated that the US and NATO rested their 
decisions to target based on this premise. Article 52 provides general protection 
for civilian objects. However, if the civilian object becomes a military objective 
by its nature, location, purpose or use making it an effective contribution to the 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in 
the circumstance ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage,171 such 
protection may cease. For instance, considering that Pancevo produced gasoline 
and other products for the Yugoslav army, it became a legitimate target.172 
On the other hand, regarding “environmentally sensitive targets” other tactical 
and strategic considerations must be given as stated under Articles 56 and 57. For 
example, Article 56 affords special protection for “works or installations 
containing dangerous forces…even where these objects are military objectives, if 
such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe 
losses among the civilian population.”173 All the same, this special protection 
could cease if the work or installation is “used in regular, significant and direct 
support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to 
terminate such support.”174 The question is, now, was it necessary to repeatedly 
bomb the industrial facilities and oil refineries from high altitudes, or was there 
an alternative to terminating the supply of gasoline and other products? 
Under obligation to weigh all considerations and protect the civilian population, 
it is highly probable that the explosion of all the aforesaid military objectives 
would release “dangerous forces.” Additionally the effects of such attacks could 
also inflict indiscriminate widespread, long-term and severe damage to both the 
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civilian population and the natural environment. Alternatively, it has been 
proposed that instead of attacking Pancevo complex as a ‘whole’, could there 
have been another tactic such as cutting off supplies or delivery routes from the 
facility through use of precision guided munitions?175 The argument does seem to 
put forward a feasible alternative with respect to targets of an environmentally 
sensitive nature. 
Article 57 obliges the military command to take complete precautions: 
1) In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian 
population, civilians and civilian objects. 
2) With respect to attacks, the following precautions shall be taken:  
a. those who plan or decide upon an attack shall  
i. do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are 
neither civilian nor civilian objects and are not subject to special 
protection but are military objectives…and; 
ii. take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of 
attacks with a view to avoiding, and in any event minimizing, incidental 
loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.176  
 
Prior to launching an attack, the laws states that if the damage may be expected 
to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military damage,177 military 
command should refrain from taking that particular action. Similar 
considerations should also be given if the methods and means may cause effects 
which cannot be limited to the military objective and thus, inherently 
indiscriminate. As Bruch recalls: 
NATO's assertion that, “the anticipated ‘very, very important’ military 
advantage outweighed the incidental human and environmental loss highlights 
the subjective nature of this decision, as well as the lack of meaningful criteria 
for evaluating it.”178 
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 The conclusion with respect to NATOs high-altitude bombing campaign was 
that although civilian casualties were unfortunately high, the “tactics deployed 
did not appear to be clearly disproportionate.”179  
To uncover the scope of the environmental damage from a scientific viewpoint, 
UNEP established the Balkans Task Force (BTF) to conduct an investigation. 
The report concluded that there was “no environmental catastrophe,” but “serious 
pollution” posing a threat to human health in particular hot spots. Regarding 
assessments of long-term ecological impacts, this proved to be a difficult 
situation for several reasons.  
First of all, a lack of baseline environmental data is a prevalent issue. Second, it 
has proven difficult to ascertain which damage was caused during wartime as 
opposed to peacetime related activities.180 Questions also had arisen as regarding 
liability for the environmental damage and how to prove exactly who did what – 
was it the Serbian armed forces or NATO? In addition, how might complex 
transboundary assessments be conducted without the proper monitoring facilities 
or environmental technologies? 
The indictment of President Slobodan Milošević for war crimes and the 
allegations for Serb atrocities was addressed by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).181In addition, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia brought forth several matters before the ICJ as alleged breaches of 
“the obligation not to cause considerable environmental damage; the obligation 
not to cause far-reaching health and environmental damage; and the obligation 
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not to use prohibited weapons,”182 was filed in a lawsuit against ten NATO 
countries.  
Several roadblocks surfaced in the attempt to hold NATO liable for the 
environmental damage. Bruch and Austin point out that the ICJ is a consent-
based system of jurisdiction. Amid this political atmosphere and the safeguard of 
national sovereignty, it has been suggested that in the “absence of a permanent 
legal fora,” the Security Council or an ad hoc fact finding mission is likely the 
only alternative to take further action toward the investigation of postwar 
environmental conditions.183Additional Protocol I (API) Article 90 encourages 
the formation of such an impartial International Fact-Finding Commission 
authorized to enquire into facts alleged to be a grave breach.184 
In view of the fact that the US and Spain did not consent to ICJ jurisdiction, the 
case brought against them was dismissed. Jurisdictional matters for the other 
eight countries underwent further consideration. Importantly to note, API has not 
yet been applied to an international tribunal.185  
In the Committee Report addressing the concerns about the environmental 
damages suffered as a consequence of the NATO bombing campaign, it had been 
concluded that the Prosecution “should not commence an investigation into the 
collateral environmental damage caused by the NATO bombing campaign.”186 
This closing remark brings forth added concerns with respect to the overall 
adequacy of addressing the environmental consequences of war, the 
establishment of normative practice, and highlights the institutional limitations 
toward enforcing liability in an even handed manner. Bruch maintains: 
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…if the law of war is to maintain its legitimacy and universal applicability, and not 
become just something imposed ad hoc by victors, the international community needs 
to undertake a credible examination of whether and to what extent NATO's actions 
comported with the international law of war… Unless acceptable conduct is explicitly 
and specifically detailed and the standards applied equally to all sides, conduct of these 
humanitarian efforts will remain of questionable legality, and could threaten the overall 
legitimacy of the international law of war regime.187 
 
The space of the thesis is too limited to address a grave threat in my analysis – 
the military’s use of depleted uranium (DU). In short, DU is a by-product of the 
uranium enrichment process; it has been classified as a radiological hazard. 
Although there is scientific uncertainty,’ the mounting evidence of its ill-effects 
and persistency are horrendous. In the case of Kosovo, severe damages of the use 
of depleted uranium could have been foreseeable, as it was used in the Gulf War. 
To summarize the use of depleted uranium’s indiscriminate and inhumane nature, 
mothers of Iraq, instead of asking if their child is a boy or girl, ask the doctor – 
“is it normal”? 
Some proclaimed effects of the DU range from low birth weight to skeletal 
abnormalities for doses at which the mother exhibited signs of chemical toxicity. 
Other recurrent birth defects include deformed or missing eyes, ears, nose, 
tongue, and genital organs. The cause of these birth defects is unknown; 
however, it is alleged to be a result of a mother to foetus transmission due to the 
radiological contamination. UK Atomic Energy Agency which provides 
expertise on matters of radiological hazards warned that depleted uranium 
radioactivity poses a “significant problem.” Upon impact of a hard target, the 
depleted uranium being released could enter into the air, water, soil and then 
pollute the natural environment for an indefinite period.  
UNGA RES 51/45E has condemned the use of depleted uranium. Reports 
indicate that NATO admitted use of depleted uranium during the Kosovo 
conflict at 112 sites. Amid reports the US admitted launching 10 tons 
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worth of depleted uranium munitions in air-strikes. It is claimed that 90-
95 missed the intended target.   
The Royal Society has warned that the carcinogenic and mutagenic health 
risks may be grossly underestimated by current theories. With its 
uncontrolled and unpredictable potential for depleted uranium to be 
carried across borders through the elemental forces of nature, not only has 
Kosovo suffered severe damage from its illegal use, but also it may likely 
extend beyond the Balkans into Albania and Macedonia, as well as 
Greece, Italy, Austria, and Hungary.  
Considering that NATO is one of the world’s most powerful military 
forces, it seems important to highlight that their leadership and military 
action could serve as a role model for organized armed groups (OAG) or 
possibly terrorist organizations. NATO actions could likely send signals 
as to what is considered permissible in wartime. Immanuel Kant reminds 
“Act that your principle of action might safely be made a law for the 
whole world.” 
We approach the millennium in a world in which global interdependence is the central 
reality, but where absolute poverty and environmental degradation cloud our vision of 
a common future, and where a geopolitical climate dominated by nuclear terrorism and 
increasing militarization saps the idealism of the young and the will to dream in us 
all.188 
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4. International Humanitarian Law and the 
Natural Environment 
4.1 The Origin of International Humanitarian Law 
Moral principles amid heated and bloodied battlefields can be traced back to 
ancient civilization. Inscribed within hallowed texts as the Old Testament and the 
Holy Qur’an, the code for a more civilized conduct respecting the natural 
environment can easily be found. Considered once a sacred obligation, armies 
were forbidden to wield an axe against trees which provided them sustenance.189  
Animals held a similar fate as wanton destruction and unnecessary suffering 
amongst non-human life was also considered immoral and unacceptable. As 
officers of some Muslim armies had a “duty to ensure trees are not burnt, nor 
unjustifiably pulled out and that women, children, the elderly and unoffending 
priests or monks should not be harmed.”190 In the Buddhist tradition, there is an 
in-depth respect and relationship with nature, and ancient Hindu codes of combat 
otherwise known as the Laws of Manu forbid the use of poisoned arrows, which 
was also observed by the ancient Greeks and Romans as a customary rule.191  
When you are at war, and lay siege to a city for a long time in order to take it, do not 
destroy its trees by taking the axe to them, for they provide you with food; you shall 
not cut them down. The trees of the field are not men that you should besiege them. 
But you may destroy or cut down any trees that you know do not yield food, and use 
them in siege works against the city that is at war with you until it falls.192 
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) in modern times is also referred to as the 
law of armed conflict or the law of war. As a cornerstone of international 
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relations, it is a vital subset of international law as these normative guidelines 
provide proper instruction on how an individual or collective regime ought to 
behave during hostilities. Being made by states, it generally reflects their will and 
consent.193  Within environments of war, similar to olden times, a combatant is 
still forbidden to cause wanton destruction and unnecessary suffering. Created by 
either treaty or customary law, IHL has hundreds of provisions or limitations 
which pronounce quite the contrary.  
There are many individuals that have shaped the legal framework throughout 
history. Nevertheless, two particular contributors have been pivotal. These men 
are known as Henry Dunant and Francis Lieber. Both men were deeply affected 
by wartime experience, and hence, highly motivated to build upon ideas set forth 
by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the Social Contract (1762): 
War is in no way a relationship of man with man but a relationship between States, in 
which individuals are only enemies by accident, not as men, but as soldiers…” Once 
they lay down their weapons “they again become mere men.” Their lives must be 
spared. 194  
 
Gasser claims that international law is supranational and that its basic rules are 
binding on all States.195 The purpose of these laws is “to maintain peace, protect 
the human being in a just order and promote social progress in freedom.”196 In 
addition, it is a framework intended to provide solutions to some humanitarian 
problems and also prevent abuse of state power. François Bugnion believes that 
the “limitation of violence is the very essence of civilization.”197 Echoing this 
point the ‘progress of civilization’ should have the effect of alleviating the 
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calamites of war.198 In modern times, this very progress of civilization is 
commonly known as “development.” 
As a civilizing stepping stone in maritime law, the Paris Declaration on 16 April 
1856 formally declared that uncertainty of laws or duties could lead to serious 
difficulties or conflict amid international relations. To prevent any confusion or 
collision it was deemed necessary to create: (i) a uniform doctrine, and (ii) fixed 
principles.199  
Francis Lieber began setting forth these guidelines on the battlefield in his work, 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, 24 
April 1863, also known as the Lieber Code. It was an effort toward developing a 
more civilized military demeanor or what he referred to as “virtues adorning a 
soldier.”200 Not only did his work enshrine some of the first rules of war, but also 
its formal codification became a military model inspiring and facilitating the 
development of IHL and other military manuals. Preserved within 157 articles201 
nearly 150 years ago are some of the most basic limitations relating to proper 
military behavior and prohibitions against the wanton destruction of property not 
justified by military necessity.  
Henry Dunant, during nearly the same period, was troubled from unrelenting 
visions from the Battlefield of Solferino in 1859. It was his nightmares that led to 
his published work titled “Memories of Solferino” which in return shocked the 
conscience of European heads of State. Dunant’s humanitarian courage and 
altruistic spirit also led to the establishment of the 1864, 1906, 1909, 1929, and 
eventually 1949 Geneva Conventions. His lifework became the main inspiration 
of IHL, serving society in its role of the relief and protection in wartime. 
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Honoring his compassionate vision, Dunant was awarded the first Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1901 together with Frédéric Passy.202 
 IHL sets limitations upon methods and means of warfare. It also aims to protect 
persons not or no longer participating in the hostilities in order to prevent 
unnecessary suffering. In a piecemeal approach in the development of wartime 
protection, the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration was a notable contribution 
toward the progress of civilization. It has been revered as the international treaty 
which set technical limitations as it banned inhumane instruments such as “arms, 
projectiles and material of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.”203  
This international treaty was foreseen as a vital development in IHL. The 
Commission at that time set forth the standard as “common agreement fixed the 
technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements 
of humanity.”204  As a basic rule the St. Petersburg Declaration established that 
“the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to accomplish during 
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”205 The law also states that the 
employment of arms or weapons which “uselessly aggravate the suffering of 
disabled men and render their death inevitable – would be contrary to the law of 
humanity.”206 Today, these fundamental laws are a part of the corpus of 
customary international law (CIL). 
In 1880 The Institute of International Law published The Laws of War on Land 
which established more limitations on injuring the enemy while attempting to 
deal with public and private property. These added efforts were reinforced by the 
First Peace Conference of The Hague in 1899 which led to the codification of 
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Hague (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of war on Land entering into 
force on 4 September, 1900.207 It would become these civilized principles and 
rules which were carried onward to the Second International Peace Conference in 
1907, known as the “Hague Laws.” 
Section II Hostilities Article 22 affirms that “the right of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”208 Article 23 affirms rules of both 
ancient and modern civilizations as it is forbidden to:  
 
employ poison or poisoned arms; kill or wound treacherously individuals 
belonging to the hostile nation or army; employ arms, projectiles, or material 
of a nature to cause superfluous injury; destroy or seize the enemy's property, 
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war.209  
 
Regarding property destruction, during sieges and bombardment it is claimed 
that all steps must be taken to spare special objects provided that they are not 
used for military purposes. It is important to note the exception whereas the 
protection of property or special objects may be overruled by military necessity. 
In the event an object or property becomes a legitimate target, it may become 
subject to attack.   
The Hague Laws and Geneva Laws are classic examples of international treaty 
law. In time, these laws became accepted as customary norms. There are a few 
important points to bear in mind with respect to instruments of international law 
whether established by treaty or custom.  First, treaty law is a formal written 
agreement. It obliges States to act in accordance with specific rules. A majority 
of states are often required to enter into a treaty ratification process before 
                                                                                                                                    
206 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight. Saint 
Petersburg, 29 November / 11 December 1868. 
207 Yale Law School. The Avalon Project: [online] http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague02.asp, (retrieved 
29 September 2010) 
208 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) (29 July 1899). Section II. On 
Hostilities. Chapter 1. On Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges, and Bombardments. Article 22 (emphasis mine) 
209 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) (29 July 1899). Section II. On 
Hostilities. Chapter 1. On Means of Injuring the Enemy, Sieges, and Bombardments. Article 23  
 69
becoming duty-bound to abide by its laws. Treaty ratification is voluntary and a 
"state need not enter into a treaty that does not conform to its interests.”210 
Additionally, reservations could be made to modify certain treaty provisions. 
This means that a state could become exempt from certain provisions while 
leaving the rest of the treaty intact, which has been referred to as a “line-item 
veto” rendering such provisions non-binding under international law. 211 In sum, 
treaty law is legally-binding only amid contracting State Parties. States that do 
not become a signatory and/or ratify a treaty agreement would not be duty-bound 
to comply with its laws – unless of course, those rules became part of customary 
international law (CIL). 
CIL is an unwritten code of international law which has developed over a period 
of time based upon the general practice of states. When a rule is accepted as 
customary practice, all states are duty-bound to its terms whether they have 
become a contracting party to the treaty agreement or not.  
Throughout the international community’s continuous progress toward 
civilization, international humanitarian law has historically made developments 
in an attempt to alleviate unnecessary suffering on the battlefield. Nevertheless, it 
is premature to suggest that IHL offers a complete framework of protection. As 
an added measure to fill the gaps of protection a catch-all phrase referred to as 
the Marten Clause was adopted. In an effort to provide enhanced protection, it 
proposes:  
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting 
parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulation 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and 
the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the 
public conscious.212 
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Even though rigorous humanitarian efforts were made throughout history, shortly 
afterward, it was the brutal aftermath of World Wars I and II which once again 
challenged the notion of civilized peoples, laws of humanity, and dictates of the 
public conscience. Stricken by a new sequence of traumatic wartime experiences, 
the international community of states called forth another endeavor to strengthen 
IHL. In hindsight, certainly – more limitations were needed. These deliberations 
sought to reform and remind individuals or collective regimes how they ought to 
behave even in periods of armed conflict. Awakened by man’s inhumanity, The 
Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949 213 would become the next endeavor at 
such a codification.  
4.2 The Geneva Conventions  
As the sinister revelations of the World Wars were unfolding, it was clear that 
international humanitarian law required further development to meet the needs of 
humanity. Upon detecting various shortcomings of wartime protection, intensive 
efforts were made to build up its practical purpose in a renowned text referred to 
as The Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949 (GC). Considered as the moral 
and legal backbone pertaining to rules of warfare, enshrined within its pages, the 
next generations of combatants were provided a set of legal guidelines in order to 
respect and ensure respect for proper military conduct on the battlefield.  
The Geneva Conventions is a text comprised of four treaties. It is the main legal 
source of wartime protection. This body of international law is also referred to as 
‘jus in bello,’ law of armed conflict, law of war, or hereinafter, as international 
humanitarian law (IHL). IHL is not stimulated by thoughts of the just or unjust 
war. The rules it sets forth are applicable only in the event of an armed conflict.   
As mentioned earlier, wartime rules are established through treaty or customary 
law. The main purpose of IHL is to introduce the element of humanity onto the 
                                              
213 ICRC.(2008) The Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949. Geneva, Switzerland 
 71
battlefield. Providing combatants with a set of strict rules and principles, it 
instills a counterbalancing force to the concept of military necessity.  
International humanitarian law aspires to “strike a balance” between humanity 
and military necessity in two basic ways. Firstly, it aims to protect people who do 
not or no longer take part in the hostilities. And secondly, it sets limitations on 
methods and means of warfare.214  
Considering that protection is IHLs’ overarching aim, when one contemplates 
protection – what should one anticipate? According to the Law Dictionary, the 
term protection implies: “to preserve in safety; to keep intact; to take care of and 
to keep safe.”215 As expected, within environments of war there are a multitude 
of considerations regarding such aims toward protection; nevertheless, an attempt 
at its formal codification has been essential toward the progress of civilization.  
Through a uniform doctrine and fixed principles, the Geneva Conventions 
established its legal foundation toward a protection founded on categorical 
persons, special objects and channels of operational care. Presently the GC is 
universally ratified, and is considered part of customary international law. In 
other words, all parties to any armed conflict are obliged to abide by its terms, 
whether they are parties to the treaty or not – this includes State and non-State 
actors. 
In light of its first aim to protect the human person who does not or no longer 
takes part in the hostilities, the GC set forth categorical persons that must be 
respected in wartime. In particular, the First Geneva Convention (GCI) set forth 
protection for the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field. The Second 
Geneva Convention (GCII) set forth protection for the wounded, sick and 
shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea. The Third Geneva Convention 
(GCIII) set forth protection for prisoners of war. And finally, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (GCIV) set forth protection for the civilian population.  
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In each of the aforesaid four treaties, the categorical persons are granted a special 
status. In recognition of this special status, combatants are obliged to protect and 
to provide a special care toward women, children, elderly and disabled persons 
in combat. Additionally, medical and religious or spiritual personnel must also be 
respected and protected.  
The Geneva Convention also establishes a means toward the identification of 
special objects. For instance, on the battlefield, places of worship, cultural 
heritage sites, hospitals, schools, civilian property, dams and dykes as well as 
other objects are provided a status of special protection. It is forbidden to attack 
these special objects, unless it is deemed an imperative military necessity.  
In addition, there are constituents of channels of care which are also provided a 
special status of protection. For instance, medical equipment and supplies, 
medical personnel, religious or spiritual personnel, war correspondents and 
methods of transportation to provide care to the wounded and sick, whether on 
land, air or upon the sea – all must be respected and protected.  
In order to combine these systematic elements of persons, objects and channels 
of care into a sort of “protective package”, and facilitate the overall humanitarian 
mission, a universal communication method was considered necessary. Visually 
communicating and combining its message of protection, an emblematic 
distinction of the Red Cross on a white background was created.216  During 
hostilities, this distinctive emblem is utilized for both indicative and protective 
purposes, and fundamentally aims to offer combatants a means of identification. 
As a result, military commanders are well-informed about particular persons and 
objects that must be specifically protected and therefore, not to become the 
subject of attack. On the other hand, this protection could be withdrawn if it is 
deemed an imperative military necessity.  
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Although the first identification toward protection began with the Red Cross, as 
of 2005, there were three distinctive emblems publicly recognized to represent 
the humanitarian endeavors of the ICRC. All three emblems are to be equally 
respected, otherwise known as the Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Crystal.  
 
 
Figure 1: The Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Crystal 
 
Under IHL, there are basic commitments that aid conflicting parties in this 
reciprocal relationship of respect and protection. GC Common Article 1 (CA1) 
states that “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure 
respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.”217 CA1 sets forth a 
protective tone toward an anticipated military conduct and affirms that states are 
“collectively obliged to assume responsibility for compliance.”218  
GC Common Article 3 (CA3) is also relevant.  This common article has been 
referred to as a sort of mini-convention as its rules are applicable in all armed 
conflicts, whether it is an international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-
international armed conflict (NIAC). CA3 affords a bare minimum of protection 
to parties of the conflict. Importantly, in connection with this thesis, however, 
CA3 does not offer protection to the natural environment.  
It is often encouraged that the Geneva Convention could provide some protection 
for the natural environment in wartime, however, amid roughly 57,000 words – 
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the term ‘natural environment’ is never mentioned. Then again, some provisions 
might be used in an attempt to protect the natural environment indirectly. 
Case in point, regarding some indirect methods of protection for the natural 
environment, Article 53 prohibits:  
Any destruction of the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging 
individually or collectively to protected persons, or to the State, or to other public 
authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, except where such destruction is 
rendered absolutely necessary to military operations.219   
 
This prohibition on the destruction of real or personal property may possibly 
offer protection to the natural environment indirectly. Nevertheless, it is 
unreliable and minimal. It is also important to note that the destruction of 
property might be overruled by an imperative military necessity. 
Within occupied territories, Article 56 offers protection to hospital 
establishments, medical personnel, public health and hygiene.220 Yet at this stage 
in the development of IHL, a fundamental component needed to attain this 
humanitarian endeavor is strikingly unseen.   
Under Article 147, another indirect means of protection is provided. This 
provision lists as a grave breach the “extensive destruction and appropriation of 
property not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and 
wantonly.”221 In essence, this provision strives to set a limitation upon the 
extensive destruction of property, which may also include the natural environment. 
For that reason, it would provide an indirect measure of protection.  
Until 1949, however, it is clear. IHL had advanced in its humanitarian endeavor. It 
established the identification and protection of categorical persons, special objects 
and channels of care. Noticeably, the law explicitly protects aspects of the man-
made environment. It forbids attacks on hospitals, schools, and places of worship, 
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cultural heritage, museums, and more. Strikingly however, the Geneva Convention 
does not mention or directly protect one of the most vital links to sustain human 
wellbeing – the natural environment. Actually, it took three more decades and the 
fright of ecocide to spark the awareness toward more protection of the natural 
environment in times of armed conflict. The Stockholm Declaration calls to mind: 
In the long and tortuous evolution of the human race on this planet a stage has been 
reached when, through the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man has 
acquired the power to transform his environment in countless ways and on an 
unprecedented scale. Both aspects of man’s environment, the natural and man-made, 
are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights and to the 
right of life itself.222 
4.3 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions  
With the adoption of 1977 Additional Protocol I (API) the natural environment 
at last hit the radar. Upon ratification and its entry into force in 1978, High 
Contracting Parties (HCP) now had supplementary provisions toward enhanced 
protection in wartime. Making its long-awaited debut, the natural environment 
was being formally acknowledged.  
API is a main legal source clearly aiming to protect the natural environment in 
wartime. Although some scholars uphold that IHL has entered into a “greening” 
stage and consider its expansion innovative, its legal adequacy remains open to 
question. Even so, other than merely indirect methods aiming to protect the 
natural environment during hostilities, direct methods are now established from 
both anthropocentric and biocentric viewpoints.  
As mentioned earlier, indirect methods imply that the natural environment may 
be protected, however it is not expressly stated. And with respect to direct 
methods of protection, the term natural environment is expressly stated and a 
rule is being provided toward its protection.  
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Nevertheless there are some valid concerns regarding the legal adequacy of 
Additional Protocol I. For instance, API does not apply to all armed conflict – it 
applies to hostilities of an international character only. As an instrument of 
international treaty law, states must be party to the Protocol in order to become 
duty-bound. Presently, API has 170 States Parties. In other words, the majority of 
UN Member States are duty-bound with its rules set forth. A valid concern, on 
the other hand, is that some of the world’s most military significant states, such 
as Indonesia, Israel and the United States are not party, 223 as of yet. Clearly the 
adherence gap could spawn an arousal of tension amid international relations and 
create complications for coalition forces, as they may be bound by different rules 
of warfare.  In short, these elements of power imbalance, uncertainty and non-
compliance could present a problematic affair which in turn may present another 
vital link and concern for sustainable development. As Peter Levine reveals with 
a profound insight: 
Our past encounters with one another have generated a legacy of fear, separation, 
prejudice, and hostility. When people are traumatized by war, the implications are 
staggering…trauma has a frightening potential to be re-enacted in the form of violence. 
Murder, poverty, homelessness, child abuse, racial and religious hated and persecution 
is all related to war. There is no avoiding the traumatic aftermath of war; it reaches into 
every segment of a society.224 
 
Attempting to resolve this concern, the universal ratification of API has been 
urged. In addition, an extension of its application of environmental provisions to 
a non-international armed conflict may also provide an enhanced protection. 
These aforesaid ideas have been previously suggested, however, ultimately 
rejected by negotiating parties of the Protocols Additional. Yet, remain possible 
suggestions toward enhanced protection of the natural environment in wartime.  
Reaffirming basic limitations, the law states:  
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In any armed conflict, the right of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or 
means of warfare is not unlimited.225  
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of 
a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.226 
 
These basic laws are accepted as customary law, and therefore, applicable to all 
state and non-state actors in both an international and non-international armed 
conflict.  
API has 102 legal provisions in total. Within this section, some of these rules, 
providing both direct and indirect means will be closely analyzed. First, in an 
effort toward direct protection, Article 35 (3) is a key provision. It aims to protect 
the natural environment by setting forth limitations on methods and means of 
warfare: 
It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may be 
expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural 
environment.”227  
 
According to Dinstein, the natural environment was not defined under 
Additional Protocol I.228  The ICRC had advised that “it should be understood in 
its widest sense to cover the biological environment in which a population is 
living.”229  For example, it should consider the fauna and flora and other climatic 
elements. Nonetheless, the notion of how to properly identify what the natural 
environment actually ‘is’ seems a common thread of concern for IHL, still open 
to debate.  
Dinstein offers another relevant point. The intended or may be expected element 
sets forth a formula accentuating premeditation and foreseeability rather than 
results. Therefore, any damages pertaining to the natural environment and hence, 
                                              
225 ICRC (1977:27): Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Art. 35(1). (emphasis mine) 
226 ICRC (1977:27): Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Art. 35(2). (emphasis mine) 
227 ICRC (1977:27): Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Art. 35 (3)  
228 Dinstein, Yoram (2004:184): The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict. United 
States: Cambridge University Press.  
229 Dinstein, Yoram (2004:184): The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict. United 
States: Cambridge University Press. (emphasis mine) 
 78
related consequences which might prejudice the health or survival of the 
population if neither intended nor expected would not be considered a breach of 
the Protocol.230 Unintentional “collateral damage” to the natural environment is 
not prohibited under this provision.  Taking into account this legal interpretation, 
another concern regarding effective implementation of the law arises. Does 
military command have ecological information during targeting decisions in 
order to conduct their operations in accordance with international humanitarian 
law? 
Taking into account that the main objective is to set strict limitations on the 
destruction of the natural environment, it remains to reconsider the legal 
threshold of harm, commonly referred to as “widespread, long-term and severe” 
damage. The WLS threshold of harm is normally considered as too vague and 
too-high to offer any meaningful protection. Dinstein claims that “No action in 
warfare is allowed to reach this threshold. Once these three criteria are satisfied, 
the action will be in breach of the Protocol – even if it is 'clearly 
proportional'.”231 Seemingly dependable, however, there are disparities as to 
what this widespread, long-term and severe threshold of harm actually is.  
The main dilemma with the threshold is ambiguity. It is argued presently that 
under API there is no clear idea or consensus as to what these terms suggest. In 
fact, two of the three criteria, widespread and severe are undefined. It has been 
suggested that widespread likely means “several hundred square kilometers” as 
defined in the ENMOD Convention. However, Additional Protocol I is not to be 
considered together with other treaties.  
Severe might be interpreted “some human impact, but not pure environmental 
damage” according to the Travaux Préparatories”232 or that which “prejudices the 
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health or survival of the population.”233  Nevertheless, a formal definition has not 
been established, as of yet.   
Under API there is consensus regarding the term long-term. It is understood that 
damage to the natural environment could last for decades, possibly twenty to 
thirty years. This length of time is generally considered as “too-long.”  
The terminological vagueness of these terms is foreseen as unacceptable. Jensen 
also believes that the biocentric approach to protect the natural environment does 
not offer enough clarity to provide the necessary deterrence or enforcement.234 
Dieter Fleck affirms that “the terms used in these different instruments do not 
provide clear definitions as to time and space.”235 As such it seems that there has 
been an attempt to set a limitation on the destruction of the natural environment, 
yet the extent of the damage permissible remains unclear.  
…first settle on the meaning of terms…. Once they have done this correctly, all they 
have to do further is to calculate the consequences of these definitions.236 
 
Dinstein maintains that “As the condition of the environmental damage is long-
term, its effects are likely to outlast the war and then any distinction between the 
civilians and combatants becomes anachronistic.”237 Therefore it seems a vital 
link that the terms widespread, long-term and severe need proper clarification 
and consensus in order to increase the effectiveness of IHL and moreover, 
strengthen the foundation which upholds sustainable development.  
Another threshold of harm concern is the conjunctive use of “and” as opposed to 
disjunctive use of “or” as expressed within the ENMOD Convention. This 
implies that all three criteria widespread, long-term and severe must be 
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established in order to constitute a breach. Hulme claims that since the “three 
terms are cumulative; it makes it that much harder to pass the threshold and 
hence, imposes less of a prohibition on military action.”238 Hulme adds that 
“most IHL lawyers peg the threshold as being too-high to matter.”239  
Adding perspective to this review, The Operational Law Handbook put forward 
that “there is little doubt that the majority of carnage caused during World Wars I 
and II (with possible exception of the two nuclear devices exploded over Japan) 
would not have met this threshold requirement.”240This statement likely suggests 
that the protection of the natural environment is inadequate. Still, another 
method of direct protection stands to be evaluated.  
Article 55 (1) states: 
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, 
long-term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of 
methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such 
damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or survival of 
the population. 241  
 
This provision is viewed as an anthropocentric approach toward environmental 
protection. Some interesting views surround its legal interpretation. Firstly, 
Jensen suggests that the issue herein relates to the effect an act has upon the 
environment, not the actor’s intention or the means or method used.242 Dinstein 
claims that it is seriously contended if this provision breaks new ground as 
compared to Article 35 (3), because it limits only environmental damage which 
prejudices the health or survival of the population. However, when the 
population’s health is prejudiced – the ban is applicable. He also points out that it 
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is interesting how the term warfare has been retained as opposed to IAC, as 
suggested by framers of the Protocol. 243 Moreover, Additional Protocol I “did 
not expressly designate the natural environment as a civilian object.244  Other 
scholars placed emphasis on the exclusion of naval and air warfare; however, it 
seemed clear that the protection of the natural environment applies to all types of 
warfare.245 
Hulme believes that Article 55 (1) is the “hidden gem of IHL provisions.”246 She 
claims that although it contains the same threshold of harm, military command is 
given a sort of stewardship role as combatants must take “care” to protect the 
natural environment from harm and exercise a general assessment when 
proposing attacks that not only harm the environment, but to what degree.247 
Additionally it is forbidden to attack the natural environment by way of 
reprisals,248 in Article 55 (2). This provision is claimed to offer significant 
protection, when respected. 
Articles 35(3) and 55 both express a direct means of protection to the natural 
environment. Be that as it may, Adam Roberts has stated that controversy 
remains about the “content, status and utility”249 of these environmental 
provisions. The ICRC also reported that although the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) expressly states that these provisions "embody a general obligation 
to protect the natural environment against, widespread, long-term and severe 
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environmental damage,” it should have stressed “to go beyond the traditional 
requirement of military necessity and impose an absolute ban on severe 
environmental damage.”250 It is still argued if these provisions are considered 
customary international law. For a variety of reasons, as previously discussed, 
these direct methods aiming to protect the natural environment in wartime seem 
inadequate. 
API also has indirect means of protection. Foremost, the principle of precaution 
is a basic condition of IHL to be observed in several ways. One of the most 
suitable obligations is regarding new methods and means of warfare.  
Article 36 states: 
 In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method 
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its 
employment would in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by 
any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party. 251 
 
Another indirect means is expressed through the special status directed toward 
the civilian population and civilian objects which are to be respected and 
protected during hostilities. Article 48 states:  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.252  
 
Is the natural environment a civilian object? The civilian object status is likely to 
advance protection for the natural environment. Hulme maintains that the natural 
environment is usually considered a civilian object. Yet, she reinforces that if the 
natural environment meets the requirement of a military objective – it is open to 
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attack. The problem then becomes the threshold of harm and aspects of the 
proportionality calculation.253   
Jensen adds that assuming the natural environment is a civilian object, it is 
inherently unlawful to target unless deemed a military necessity.  However, 
military command must demonstrate that the environment targeted meets the 
“nature, location, purpose, or use test.”254 As stated earlier, Dinstein points out 
that the natural environment was not expressly designated as a civilian object.255 
It seems this view is still open to discussion. 
In view of the fact that civilian objects could turn into military objectives, and 
thus, lawfully targeted, it seems important to understand how this protective shift 
occurs. Article 52 (2) defines a military objective in the following terms:  
Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, 
purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or 
partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.256  
 
Targets must meet the criteria of nature, location, purpose or use to become a 
lawful military objective. Jensen adds that by its nature, the environment is not a 
military objective and could not be considered a dual-use target serving military 
and civilian purposes. He claims that there is nothing intrinsic to the natural 
environment that would make it such. 257 In its place, he draws attention to 
objects such as weapons, fortifications, transports, equipment and similar to 
items that are military objectives by their nature. 
Another analysis has been recommended with regard to location. Based on its 
location, an attack upon civilian objects such as, bridges or other constructions 
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could make an effective contribution to military action.258  Such attacks could 
also damage the natural environment; however, it may be considered permissible 
harm if it is in accordance with other wartime rules and principles. In addition, 
purpose is said to be related to “the intended future use of an object.”259 Lastly 
there, is the concept of use. If the enemy “uses” the natural environment as a 
means of cover or concealment, it can turn into a military objective and hence, be 
lawfully targeted, as previously described in the case of Vietnam.   
Another line of defense in the protection of the natural environment is based on 
imposing the limitation on which indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.260  
Unlawful attacks are those which: 
a) are not directed at a specific military objective 
b) employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective; or 
c) employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by 
this Protocol261 
 
 
Furthermore, if the attack “may be expected” to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, 
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated,”262 it is unlawful. It seems important at this juncture to 
reflect upon the various ways in which the natural environment may be vitally 
linked to these aforesaid losses, injuries and damages associated with the 
specifically protected civilian statuses.  
Another important factor concerning modern warfare is the increasing suspicion 
which surrounds the distinction principle of the protected civilian status. 
Accordingly, the element of uncertainty is also addressed for combatants under 
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Additional Protocol I whereas in cases of doubt, objects shall be considered as 
civilian objects and not become the object of attack.263  
The natural environment is also protected as Article 54 prohibits “…to attack, 
destroy, remove, or render useless objects indispensible to the survival of the 
civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of 
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and 
irrigation works...”264 These objects are not to be made the object of reprisals. 
Thus far, this provision has not been contested. Regarding these vital basic 
necessities such as food and water, API states: 
…in no event shall actions against these objects be taken which may be expected to 
leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to cause its 
starvation or force its movement.265 
 
Another noteworthy indirect method could also be considered a vital link 
between IHL and SD. It aims to protect works and installations containing 
dangerous forces, and therefore, it protects the surrounding natural environment. 
The provision indicates specifically protected objects of importance to the 
civilian population which also contain a potential power to unleash unlawful 
forms of destruction. These specifically protected objects are marked with a 
distinctive emblem, as ‘three bright orange circles’ facilitate the location, 
identification and protection.266   
 
 
Fig. 2: Distinctive emblem for the protection of works and installations  
containing dangerous forces 
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Article 56 states:  
Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical engineering stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where 
these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of 
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other 
military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall 
not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous 
forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the 
civilian population.267 
 
Roberts states, however, that these objects are not immune from attack.268 For 
instance, the special protection afforded could cease if the object is used for other 
than its normal function, or used in regular, significant and direct support of 
military operations, or when it is the only feasible way to terminate such 
support.269 If respected, this provision could offer significant protection for the 
natural environment. However, military necessity could once again override the 
protection desired. These objects are not permitted to become the object of 
reprisals.  
As mentioned earlier, IHL requires that precaution is taken during military 
operations. Article 57(1) states that within the conduct of military operations a 
constant care shall be provided to spare the civilian population, civilians and 
civilian objects. Hulme emphasizes that this does include the natural 
environment.270 In addition, precautions must be taken while selecting methods 
and means of warfare in order to avoid or minimize incidental loss of life, injury 
or damage, and for that reason, combatants must:  
Do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither 
civilians nor civilian objects and are not subject to special protection but are military 
objectives.271 
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Without a doubt, API has indentified the natural environment as a separate 
matter of concern upon the battlefield. Protection is sought-after through both 
direct and indirect means. Some scholars argue that the legal framework of IHL 
is adequate, though a wider adherence and compliance remains an issue.  
By contrast, others scholars argue that the legal framework of IHL is inadequate. 
There is claimed to be a clear lack in understandable rules as well as verification 
and enforcement mechanisms. The ICRC admits that Additional Protocol I does 
not cover all cases of environmental damage. It is recommended therefore that 
former conventional and customary rules of the 1907 Hague Regulations and 
1949 Geneva Conventions continue to offer significant environmental protection. 
Be that as it may, the evidence revealed of past environmental damage in the 
collective cases previously reviewed would be the current representation of the 
permissible threshold of harm. Is it a degree of acceptable destruction in the view 
of the international community of states?    
Amid the pendulum swing of these divergent views and critical environmental 
concerns mounting, an attempt was made toward the further development of 
IHL. A Fifth Geneva Convention has been recommended to contend with 
increasing protection for the natural environment in wartime – yet it was a step 
that the international community of states was not willing to take, at that time. 
Our Common Future draws attention to key concerns respecting the legal means 
toward approaching this indispensible form of protection to realize sustainable 
development: 
National and international law has traditionally lagged behind events. Today, legal 
regimes are being rapidly outdistanced by the accelerating pace and expanding scale 
of impacts on the environmental base of development. Human laws must be 
reformulated to keep human activities in harmony with the unchanging and universal 
laws of nature.272 
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4.4  Protocol II Additional of 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions  
Additional Protocol II of 1977 (APII) is the applicable treaty law in the event of 
an internal or non-international armed conflict (NIAC). It is important to mention 
that APII does not include a direct method of protection for the natural 
environment. It offers only an indirect method of protection and as formerly 
mentioned, it is applicable to the states which have ratified the treaty.  
APII has strict requirements that need to be met prior to its legal application.  For 
example, the conflict must be between a State Party and dissident group or other 
organized armed group (OAG). The OAG must control a significant part of the 
state territory, must be under a responsible military command and must be able to 
carry out “sustained and concerted military actions” to implement the Protocol. 
Once these requirements have been satisfied, APII and Common Article 3 (CA3) 
shall apply cumulatively.  
With limited means of protection for the natural environment in an internal 
conflict, this could present some real concerns for sustainable development. It is 
commonly recognized that organized armed groups have been significant 
contributors toward the unsustainable exploitation of various natural resources, 
for example, timber, semi-precious stones and other high-valued items. 
Under Additional Protocol II, the natural environment is protected indirectly, and 
these provisions set forth are basically a reiteration of Additional Protocol I. The 
most commonly cited provisions are Article 14, which addresses the protection 
of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, and Article 15 
which addresses the protection of works and installations containing dangerous 
forces, for example, nuclear engineering stations.  
As previously stated, the special protection status of a civilian object might offer 
an indirect means of protection toward the natural environment; however, this 
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protection may cease. As a result, these once protected civilian objects could 
become a legitimate military objective, and thus, become open to attack.  
Common Article 3 provides a bare minimum of applicable rules during hostilities 
of an internal character.273 Still, there is no protection being provided to the 
natural environment in such incidents. In section I (a), basic rules are outlined 
whereas “violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture is forbidden;” however, it does not make 
any explicit connection that the protection of the natural environment is a vital 
link with respect toward these other forms of violence to life.  
In view of that, it is important to rethink how an armed conflict of a non-
international or internal character, especially, those not bound by Additional 
Protocol II might become enhanced to create a more meaningful protection for 
the natural environment. In IHLs current legal position, the natural environment 
remains considerably vulnerable during periods of hostilities. Therefore, it is my 
observation that the protection of the natural environment in a NIAC context is 
virtually non-existent, and hence, deemed inadequate.  
4.5 Principles in Armed Conflict  
In the event of an armed conflict, international humanitarian law is also upheld 
through a set of legal principles which must be strictly observed between the 
conflicting parties. While in force, the proper applications of such principles aim 
to establish a disciplined military conduct, as well as respect and reciprocity upon 
the battlefield.  
In particular, these wartime legal principles are referred to as: military necessity, 
distinction, proportionality and humanity. Each principle strengthens the legal 
framework of IHL as it requires that combatants respect and ensure respect for 
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strict limitations upon wartime destruction. All of the aforesaid principles are 
considered as part of customary international law. Thus, these principles are 
applicable in the event of an armed conflict, whether it is of an international or 
non-international character, and must be observed by state and non-state actors. 
In IHL, the military necessity principle has an important function. It is an 
obligation imposed upon the military command to minimize harm to both the 
civilian population and its property. It achieves this limitation on destruction 
through a counterbalance of the humanity principle. Although military 
commanders must consider destruction of the natural environment, some argue 
that the natural environment will not be adequately protected because of this 
military necessity doctrine. 274 Jensen adds that “while a number of principles 
relate to protection of the environment during warfare, they are all subordinated 
to the principle of military necessity."275 However, it is important to note that 
“military necessity is not a license for unbridled destruction.”276 
Lieber had mentioned that military necessity is “understood by modern civilized 
nations as consisting of those measures which are indispensible for securing the 
ends of war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of 
war.”277 He also professed the military necessity principle as “doing what is 
necessary to achieve war aims.”278 Yet nowadays, such basic considerations must 
incorporate assessment respecting the natural environment. Conversely, although 
the military necessity principle is intended to counterbalance other fundamental 
principles such as proportionality and humanity, it seems evident that military 
necessity often takes precedence. Susan Chamorro put emphasis on: 
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The notion of military necessity, referred to in the ICJ opinion must be changed 
significantly or understood differently. A perceived lack of objective standards in the 
application of this principle is one of the main obstacles to environmental protection 
in armed conflict. It has been stated that principle of state responsibility and the 
precautionary principle would be a starting point.279 
 
Military necessity is based on facts at the moment a military decision is taken. 
Within targeting processes, the general view is that “it is likely that a commander 
would not be expected to sacrifice a solider to save a tree."280 Although most 
would agree with this clear-cut decision, there remain imperative ecological 
considerations that will need to be taken in perhaps more complex situations. In 
light of such, Professor Richard A. Falk claims: 
To be lawful, weapons and tactics involving the use of force must be reasonably 
necessary to the attainment of their military objective. No superfluous or excessive 
application of force is lawful, even if the damage done is confined to the 
environment, thereby sparing people and property. 281 
 
The distinction principle is another vital consideration. It requires that 
combatants within the targeting process must at all times make a distinction 
between civilian objects and military objectives. Concerning weapon selection 
and tactic used, this distinction must also be made. Under assumption that the 
natural environment is viewed as a civilian object, it would be granted special 
protection and therefore, added consideration prior to attack, if deemed a military 
necessity. The expected military advantage must outweigh the collateral damage 
to civilians and civilian objects. As a general rule, the distinction principle aims 
to protect the civilian population and civilian objects, as an attack without 
justifiable military necessity is unlawful. The law plainly states:  
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
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accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.282 
 
In the event military command and combatants make the necessary distinction, 
once military objectives are chosen, the proportionality principle has a vital role 
in the protection of the natural environment. When respected, the proportionality 
principle prohibits military action which is not in direct proportion to the threat 
perceived by opposing parties. For that reason, the application of proportionality 
principle has the potential to halt excessive destructive force, prevent conflict 
escalation and provide considerable protection.  
Thomas Franck claims that the “Mainstream of international proportionality 
discourse is encountered where one party has taken an action thought to be 
unlawful by another and that second party has resorted to 
counters…proportionality assess the lawfulness of the countermeasures.”283 
Formulaically he also suggests that “A has done (or threatens to do) X to B, and B 
responds by doing Y to A. The issue then becomes…whether countermeasure Y is 
equivalent (i.e proportionate) to X.”284  
Seemingly a clear-cut formula, proportionality is not so easily applied in 
practice. One reason for the difficulty in its application is uncertainties and 
disparities in values. These often diverse and contradictory viewpoints of what is 
perceived as valuable by parties to the conflict can sometimes tip the scale of 
desirable equivalences. Taking into consideration finite natural resources, indeed 
there are aspects of the natural world that are increasingly considered priceless. 
For example, oil, water, and timber are a few high-valued resources. Although 
the principle of proportionality provides some challenge in its formal application, 
it has been mentioned that because of its restraining effects and credibility in 
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decision-making processes, proportionality has “achieved currency” and… is a 
tool that seems to work.285 
Dinstein adds that to be in accordance with proportionality, “an attack on a 
military objective must be desisted from if the effect on the environment 
outweighs the value of the military objective.”286 This viewpoint has added 
support through various official statements. NATO claims, that during its 
bombing campaign and targeting decisions against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia that “all possible collateral damage, be it environmental, human or to 
the civilian infrastructures” were taken into account.287 
It is clear that states are expected to take environmental considerations into 
account when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of 
legitimate military objectives. In general, proportionality is a vital link in the 
protection of the natural environment. Nevertheless, one question still remains. 
How does military command evaluate ecological considerations and possible 
collateral damage to appropriately execute a ‘proportionality test’? The ICRC 
submits:  
Proportionality seeks to balance humanitarian requirements with the necessities of 
war. The prohibition against 'disproportionate attack' stems from the principle of 
proportionality and is defined by API as an attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated. Therefore, the rule prohibiting disproportionate 
attacks requires that the extent of possible collateral damage be assessed before 
launching an attack. When the civilian losses and damages that are foreseeable are 
out of proportion with the expected military advantage, the interests of the civilian 
population should always prevail. After all, IHL requires that care be taken 
constantly to spare civilians and civilian objects and it forbids attacking parties to 
inflict any injury or damage that can reasonably be avoided.”288 
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Last but not least, the humanity principle aims to prevent and alleviate 
unnecessary suffering. The vital essence of the humanity principle in the pursuit 
of SD is clear. As a countermeasure to the principle of military necessity, this 
principle has a long-standing role in wartime ethics. The humanity principle 
requires use of minimal force to achieve legitimate military objectives. It forbids 
methods and means of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering. Until now, it is understood that unnecessary suffering 
refers to the infliction of injuries or suffering beyond what is required to achieve 
the military aim. Although there is no legal concept put forward to concretize 
unnecessary suffering, it has been stated that the humanitarian disadvantages 
should not outweigh the military advantages. Professor Falk formulates the 
principle as follows:  
To be lawful, no weapon or tactic can be validly employed if it causes unnecessary 
suffering to its victims, whether this is by way prolonged or painful death or is in a 
form calculated to cause severe fright or terror. Accordingly, weapons and tactic that 
spread poison or disease or do genetic damage are generally illegal per se, as they 
inflict unacceptable forms of pain, damage, death and fear; all forms of ecological 
disruption would appear to fall within the sway of this overall prohibition.289 
In order to complete the necessary means of protection under IHL, it seems that 
the natural environment cannot possibly be overlooked respecting the humanity 
principle. This interlocked relationship necessitates a keen awareness and means 
for suitable calculation respecting this vital relationship between man and nature 
– as a holistic unit. Otherwise, how can legal principles in wartime become 
effectively implemented? Simply put, I would argue – they cannot be. 
Long ago, Liebler made an interesting discovery. Upon analyzing the authentic 
text in French, he believes that perhaps some elements of protection were lost in 
translation. His rationale is as follows: 
The words "propres a causer des maux superflus" are more accurately translated as "a 
nature to cause superfluous injury." The significance of this wording for present 
purposes is that the word "injury" is not limited to personal harm. It includes property 
damage, environmental damage, or damage to any "thing" as indicated by the 
following definition of "injury" in Webster's Third New International Dictionary. 
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“INJURY...the act or result of inflicting on a person or thing something that causes 
loss, pain, distress, or impairment.290 
 
All else considered, it is important to note that these legal principles in armed 
conflict have an elastic quality. In order to take hold of what actual protection 
could be offered, it has been advised to be familiar with the dynamic quality that 
each principle puts forth by viewing them operationally and ask – “what is it they 
achieve in practice?”291 
Overall, if respected, each of these aforesaid legal principles has a vital function 
toward the protection of the natural environment. Similar to a muscle, it has been 
said that the more these principles are exercised in wartime, based upon balanced 
targeting decisions and practical secondary opinions, the stronger their positions 
will become understood within the legal framework of IHL.   
                                              
290 Ruiz-Roque, Orlando. (1995:19): The Laws of Armed Conflict and Environmental Protection: Striking a Balance. 
International Law at the End of the Century. DTIC. 
291 Franck, Thomas M. (2008:717): “On Proportionality of Countermeasure in International Law.” The American 
Journal of International Law. American Society of International Law. Vol. 102, No. 4. pp. 715-767 
 96
4.6 Customary International Law and the Natural 
Environment 
 
Customary international law (CIL) is an unwritten body of law which develops 
over a period time based upon the general practice of states. Dinstein claims that 
it crystallizes with evidence of a general practice accepted as law.  Once a rule is 
accepted as customary, the rule becomes a formal obligation which must be 
observed and respected by all state and non-state actors.  
 In an effort to strengthen the current position of customary law in the event of 
armed conflict, the ICRC had undertaken an extensive investigation. Throughout 
the examination a host of state practices established in international instruments, 
environmental treaties, military manuals, formal statements, military plans and 
reports were taken into consideration.  Following approximately 10-12 years of 
in-depth analysis, the protection of the natural environment was formally listed 
as customary law. Conversely, not all States are in agreement with this position. 
It is apparent that all of the basic IHL principles: military necessity, distinction, 
proportionality and humanity are established as CIL. Despite the character of the 
conflict, whether international or non-international, the lawful application of 
these principles must be applied relating to the natural environment. Following 
the ICRC’s report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in 1993, 
this customary obligation was accepted.  More specifically, the report states: 
 
No part of the environment may be attacked, unless it is a military objective. Destruction 
of any part of the natural environment is prohibited, unless required by imperative 
military necessity. Launching an attack against a military objective which may be 
expected to cause incidental damage to the environment which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated is prohibited.292 
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The ICRC’s position is that the natural environment is protected under 
customary international law. Yet, there are some considerations regarding its 
practical application. Similar to other rules highlighted before, the first 
consideration is if the natural environment is considered as a civilian object. If 
the natural environment is viewed in this manner, it would be provided a measure 
of special protection under the distinction principle – and henceforth, create a 
customary pause in the targeting process.   
Another consideration, as a customary rule, it is unlawful for the belligerent to 
destroy property that is not justified by imperative military necessity. Any 
violation of this basic rule may constitute a grave breach under GCIV. The 
International Court of Justice affirms, “Respect for the environment is one of 
those elements that go into assessing whether an action is in conformity with the 
principle of necessity.”293  
If the target is deemed a military necessity, the collateral damage upon the 
natural environment must not be excessive to the direct military advantage 
anticipated. In other words, it must be proportionate. ICJ maintains that “in order 
to satisfy the requirement of proportionality, attacks against military targets 
which are known or can reasonably be assumed to cause grave environmental 
harm may need to confer a very substantial military advantage in order to be 
considered legitimate.”294  
By some scholars, the natural environment is plainly being substituted through 
concepts of the civilian object and property. Even so, there are unsettling 
concerns in relation to the language being used to secure the protection of these 
specifically protected objects. For instance, certain expressions are open to 
reflection and interpretation, such as imperative military necessity, may be 
expected, excessive and anticipated. Clearer understandings of these above 
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expressions should receive further attention in order to sharpen the overall 
meaning and application in relation to these terms and therefore, the protection 
preferred.  
It is also currently argued that the natural environment is offered indirect and 
direct protection under CIL. Mirroring the language of Additional Protocol I, 
there are special objects that should receive an added protection. In terms of 
indirect methods of protection, for instance, there are particular works and 
installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical generating stations, and other installations located at or in their vicinity 
that are not to become the object of attack. Once more, these are not totally 
immune from attack and the protection of these vital infrastructures may cease 
based on the principle of military necessity.  
In addition, ICRC has proposed two rules which provide direct protection to the 
natural environment as a matter of customary international law. Attempting to 
resolve concerns of conflict characterization, it has been suggested that these 
rules are applicable in all armed conflict, whether international or internal.295 The 
following rules place limitations on methods and means of warfare, as well as, 
their effects upon the natural environment. 
Rule 44 states: 
Methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard to the protection 
and preservation of the natural environment. In the conduct of military operations, 
all feasible precautions must be taken to avoid, and in any event to minimize, 
incidental damage to the environment. Lack of scientific certainty as to the effects on 
the environment of certain military operations does not absolve a party to the 
conflict from taking such precautions.296 
 
Rule 45 states: 
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The use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment is 
prohibited. Destruction of the natural environment may not be used as a weapon. 297 
 
Dinstein validates the customary viewpoint that upon launching an attack 
“environmental considerations must play a role in the targeting process.”298 And 
it is clear, that from a proposed customary position both anthropocentric and 
biocentric perspectives are being taken into consideration. Reinforcing the point, 
whether the civilian population is present or not, it is not allowed to cause 
environmental harm if it is expected to be excessive in relation to the military 
gain anticipated.299 Dinstein explains however, that after such environmental 
considerations and proportionality is observed, “An attack against a military 
objective is liable to produce legitimate collateral damage to the environment.”300  
According to Roberts, the US Administration was opposed to these rules 
regarding protection to the natural environment stating that “it was too broad and 
ambiguous and is not part of customary law.”301 Dinstein adds that he does not 
take a CIL standpoint in connection with Additional Protocol I Articles 35(3) and 
55(1). He admits that these rules did constitute an innovation in IHL, but the 
adoption of these provisions “to be accepted as part and parcel of customary 
international law…. is wrong.”302 The argument was supported in connection 
with the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, as Dinstein states:  
…the provisions of the Protocol 'provide additional protection for the environment' and 
'[t]hese are powerful constraints for all the States having subscribed to these 
provisions.’ Surely, States which have not subscribed to these provisions (by becoming 
contracting Parties to the Protocol) are not bound by these constraints. In other words, 
the relevant Protocol's clauses have not yet crystallized as customary international 
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law.303 
 
The above-mentioned statement was provided before the ICRC’s comprehensive 
study in 2005. Further research and attention regarding the status of these rules as 
a matter of customary law is recommended, as it should enhance protection of 
the natural environment in wartime.  
Apart from the controversy of its universal acceptance as CIL, the natural 
environment is gaining respect and momentum toward more protection. Evidence 
of a piecemeal approach is well-noted in the course of international relations. For 
example, in 2001, the UNGA declared 6 November “International Day for 
Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and Armed Conflict.”304 
Recognizing the global shift in environmental conditions and its role as a matter 
of international peace and security, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon draws 
attention to the fact:  
As global population rises and the demand for resources grows, the potential for 
conflicts over resources could intensify. The impacts of climate change may 
exacerbate these threats. In response, we will need to develop new thinking on 
sources of insecurity and ensure that our preventive diplomacy takes into account the 
trans-boundary nature of ecosystems and environmental degradation. 305 
 
Aiming to elevate the dictates of the public environmental conscience, during the 
2nd IUCN World Conservation Congress in 2000, an environmental edition of 
the Martens Clause was formally adopted. UN member states were asked for their 
support in good-faith to observe and respect: 
Until a more complete international code of environmental protection has been 
adopted, in cases not covered by international agreements and regulations, the 
biosphere and all its constituents elements and processes remain under the protection 
and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, 
from dictates of the public conscience, and from the principles and fundamental 
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values of humanity acting as steward for present and future generations.”306 
 
It is central to underscore with respect to protection of the natural environment 
that there are a handful of states which have earned a reputation as “persistent 
objectors.”307 In particular, France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
have been considered the main dissenters with regard to customary rule 45 and 
the widespread, long-term and severe threshold. Meanwhile it is also important to 
stress that there are numerous states that do consider these rules as CIL.  
It seems imperative to also reflect upon how the voice of each state is heard and 
weighed in the midst of international relations. As for the present time, it has 
been expressed that the opinion of some states seem to prevail over the interests 
of others, and sometimes it is regarding important issues that remain in the best 
interest of the international community, as a whole.  
From a theoretical standpoint, realism and liberalism seem interlocked in an 
environmental affair. Some nations appear resistant to offering added protection 
to the natural environment, while others clearly support the development of its 
customary position. Yet, there is another creeping concern in this interlocked 
battle. Lust for power is increasingly shared with non-state actors in modern 
warfare. This point of view is a serious problem that is particularly alarming in 
contemporary times and should place added considerations upon states with 
respect to IHL’s ability to protect the natural environment in NIAC.  
The possible view of a new form of imperialism seems to overshadow recent 
wartime events. Albeit the international community of states has expressed the 
desire to attain sustainable development, there is an incontestable element of 
dependency amid war-torn societies being imposed by some military significant 
“western” nations. Some other nations, predominately Arab and African states,  
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are being left crippled by collapsed infrastructures, minimal aid, and toxic 
wastelands caused by the widespread, long-term and severe damage unto the 
natural environment.  According to Chamorro, “NATO countries insisted on 
more freedom to produce collateral damage, while developing countries had 
argued for restrictions.”308 From a postmodernist position, the urge arises to 
reconsider – what is development and who actually is it for? 
Nevertheless, there is a force more powerful than any nation state or alliance; it is 
the force of Mother Nature. Illumined by swift change of environmental disaster, 
the spirit of good will and international co-operation of many states have been 
realizing the value of universal green interest. Indeed there are persistent 
objectors; however, customary international law is formed by the general practice 
of all states. For that reason, as a body of international law, the entire 
international community has an opportunity to develop customary legal 
protection of the natural environment in both peacetime and wartime. With each 
judicial decision and secondary advisory opinion exercised in favor to protect the 
natural environment on national, regional and international fronts, its customary 
recognition is strengthened. And since prevention is better than cure, forethought 
preferable than afterthought, it is a strength that is needed to combat the 
predicted environmental challenges ahead.  
4.7 Additional Texts 
In addition to the aforesaid legal sources, there are several other international 
instruments which aim to protect the natural environment in wartime. Some 
discernable paths toward additional protection are established though limitations 
concerning the physical, biological and chemical elements under disarmament 
law. Although these elements are addressed through specific Conventions, for 
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example, the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), 
the space herein is too limited. However, it would have been fascinating to 
explore these treaties in more detail as it is could likely establish a direct link to 
General Verri’s formal definition of the natural environment. And since this 
component is claimed missing, it presents an interesting area for further research. 
Even so, it is important to discuss two additional texts. The first treaty is relevant 
because it prohibits the use of the natural environment as a weapon of war. The 
second is essential because it relates to the development of widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment as a war crime under the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
4.7.1 The ENMOD Convention  
During the Vietnam War (1966-1972), there was a top secret US military mission 
called Operation Popeye. Throughout this period, nearly 47,000 units of cloud-
seeding materials were used to cause persistent rainfall to hamper the enemies’ 
movement. Not only did this military activity spark the human imagination as 
geophysical warfare became possible, but also it ignited the need to create a new 
international agreement among states. For what was once believed as science 
fiction was now dawning as a potential reality – the natural environment was 
being used a weapon of war.  
Accordingly, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (the ENMOD Convention) was 
adopted by the United Nations on 10 December 1976. Although the ENMOD 
Convention was a post-factum development, which historically is a common trait 
of international law, the treaty provided the first set of legal provisions 
concerning environmental warfare. 
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On the alert of lurking environmental threats being entertained inside the military 
industrial complex, the ENMOD Convention sought-after a strict prohibition on 
environmental warfare tactics. Primarily, the agreement set forth the prohibition 
on particular geophysical warfare tactics, such as artificial earthquakes, climatic 
modification, crop destruction, hurricanes, tsunamis, weather manipulation and 
more.  
Why is the ENMOD Convention a vital link to sustainable development? The 
reason is simple. Some military activities that are considered as an ENMOD 
violation are: the alteration of the ionosphere, eradication of species, introduction 
of invasive species, manipulation of the ozone levels, provoking flood or 
drought, use of herbicides, seeding clouds, setting fires and deforestation.309 As 
an instrument of disarmament law, the establishment of this international treaty 
was considered visionary and precautionary because geophysical modification 
did not factor significantly into military planning at that time. Although ratified 
by more or less 70 countries, the ENMOD Convention is claimed to be largely 
unknown and unenforced.310  
The ENMOD Convention protects the natural environment as it ultimately halts 
its manipulation and use as a weapon of war. On the other hand, ENMOD does 
not protect the natural environment from ‘collateral damage’ caused by other 
military activities in general. To constitute a violation, there are three criteria 
which establish the magnitude of environmental damage under ENMOD; this is 
known as the widespread, long-term, severe threshold or ‘troika’. 311 According 
to the ENMOD Convention, one of the following criteria “widespread, long-
lasting or severe effects” must result and be scientifically proven from the 
environmental modification technique (EMT) employed.  
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Article I stipulates: 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage in military or any other 
hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting 
or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to any other State 
Party.312 
 
The threshold of harm set forth in ENMOD Article I, unlike Additional Protocol 
I, is accompanied by a set of clear understandings. These terms are defined as 
follows: 
Widespread  is defined as encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square 
kilometers; long-lasting is defined as lasting for a period of months, or approximately a 
season; and severe  is defined as involving serious or significant disruption or harm to 
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.313 
      
Considering that these are two significant treaties aiming to protect the natural 
environment in wartime, Bouvier argues that the ENMOD Convention and API 
are complementary, but some tricky problems could arise.314 One problem is that 
the threshold of permissible harm has different meanings associated between the 
two instruments.  
As mentioned before, Additional Protocol I uses the term long-term which 
permits environmental damage for decades, possibly twenty to thirty years. In 
contrast, ENMOD uses the term long-lasting which permits environmental 
damage for only a period of months or approximately a season. Regarding the 
temporal scope, this provides a notable difference with respect to permissible 
harm onto the natural environment.  
Additionally, under ENMOD the three criteria are disjunctive. This implies that 
through the use of “or,” only one element of ‘widespread, long-lasting or severe’ 
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is needed to constitute a violation. Additional Protocol I uses the conjunctive 
“and” which suggests all three criteria of the threshold must be satisfied.  
To enhance protection for the natural environment, some scholars argue that the 
understandings from ENMOD should offer an interpretative sight as to what the 
limitations should represent with reference to API. In opposition, it has been 
established that ENMOD “is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the 
same or similar terms if used in connection with any other international 
agreement.”315  
Jensen upholds, however, that the WLS standard should be discarded and a strict 
liability standard should be applied. He adds that “it is not unreasonable to 
advocate changes to terms that were molded almost thirty years ago at a time 
when warfare's effects on the environment were not so potentially catastrophic.  
Military commanders must consider the environmental repercussions of all 
military operations.”316 
The First Review Conference had affirmed that ENMOD Article II was adequate 
to fulfil the purposes of the Convention.317 It states that the term environmental 
modification techniques (EMT): 
 …refers to any technique for changing – through the deliberate manipulation of 
natural processes – the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its 
biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space.”318 
 
In light of the language of Article II, a few other considerations arise. Dinstein 
claims that the military action proscribed must be intentional, and consist of the 
manipulation of natural processes causing widespread, long-lasting or severe 
effects. He also underscores that “if these effects are not produced, the use of an 
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environmental modification technique (albeit hostile) would be excluded from 
the scope of the prohibition.”319  
Whether offensive or defensive, in order to be forbidden the environmental 
modification technique employed must be military or hostile.320 If the military or 
hostile use causes widespread, long-lasting or severe destruction, damage or 
injury to the natural environment, it must have been inflicted by another 
contracting party to the agreement to constitute a violation.321  
Important to note, not all environmental modification techniques are prohibited. 
Its use is considered as ‘dual-use’ purpose. For instance, modifications to the 
natural environment can be used for peaceful purposes. The ENMOD 
Convention recognized that modification techniques may have the potential to 
‘improve’ the relationship between man and nature as it may perhaps “contribute 
to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit of 
present and future generations.”322 That in mind, environmental modification 
techniques could present a remarkable vital link to rethink prospective and 
harmless uses of the natural environment toward the attainment of sustainable 
development. As ENMOD Article 3 (2) set forth an alternative vision to warfare: 
States Parties in a position to do so shall contribute, alone or together with other States 
or international organizations, to international economic and scientific co-operation in 
the preservation, improvement, and peaceful utilization of the environment, with due 
consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.323 
 
Indeed a visionary statement toward the achievement of environmental 
wellbeing, however, the EMNOD Convention has other shortcomings. During 
the Second Review Conference it has been suggested to establish ENMODs 
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clarification in scope. Toward wider coverage of environmental protection, it was 
recommended that an EMT should be one regardless of the specific technique 
employed or its technological sophistication324 and that unless some of these 
understandings are dealt with, such as, the “deliberate manipulation of natural 
processes,” the ENMOD Convention will remain “for all practical intents and 
purposes, inapplicable.325  
On the whole, the ENMOD Convention is deemed inadequate in the protection 
of the natural environment. For instance, firstly, its span of protection excludes 
weapon development and testing. Secondly, the language regarding modification 
techniques is claimed to be too vague, the scope is too narrow, the threshold of 
harm is too high and the verification mechanism is too weak.326 Thirdly, 
ENMOD requires a scientific assessment of the environmental damage, which 
basically implies that if there is a lack of scientific knowledge with respect to a 
particular ecosystem, it can hinder a viable assessment.327 Chamorro claims that a 
“true extent of environmental damage can never be known in an ecosystem not 
fully characterized before the damage is done.”328  
 In addition to these shortcomings, the ENMOD Convention does not provide the 
necessary provisions to penalize contracting parties in violation of its terms. 
Instead, HCPs are expected to develop the suitable laws for implementation and 
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sanctions.329 Notwithstanding, even if environmental damage occurred which met 
all of the above conditions, the procedure for complaint is dependent upon the 
Security Council and accordingly, subject to veto.330 Concerning ENMODs 
practical effect, the Government of Jordan states: 
…ENMOD was revealed as being painfully inadequate during the Gulf Conflict. We 
find that the terms of the existing convention are so broad and vague as to be 
virtually impossible to enforce. We also find no provision for a mechanism capable 
of investigation and settlement of any future disputes under the Convention. 
Furthermore, The Convention does not provide for advanced environmental 
scientific data to be made available to all States at the initial stages of crisis 
prevention. Proposal for an effective mechanism to combat the exploitation of the 
environment in times of armed conflict....we believe that this may lead to the 
drafting of a new treaty, and we trust that any such treaty would give all humanity 
the confidence to face a more peaceful future.”331 
In the meantime, it has been stated that the only way protection of the natural 
environment is possible in armed conflict is if participation in the ENMOD 
Convention and Additional Protocol I is universal.332 As of today, it is not. 
As we produce more and more technology, and as we recognize the constant 
generation of all sorts of unexpected effects, we clearly have a duty to guard more 
and more against what is almost a complete unknown. We have no way of 
foreseeing those cases in which laws of nature and new phenomena will interact in a 
single technological achievement in a harmful or even catastrophic way. Are we then 
culpable if we introduce new technology in this ignorant way?333 
4.7.2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court  
With the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on 17 
July 1998, the institutional capacity and jurisdiction to prosecute “the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”334 was 
created. The Rome Statute as of 12 October 2010335  has 114 States Parties which 
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is comprised of: 31 African States, 15 Asian States, 18 Eastern European States, 
25 Latin American and Caribbean States, and 25 Western European and other 
States.336  
This level of international participation reflects an increasing interest toward 
developing enforcement mechanisms for IHL. Taking into account that there is a 
total of 192 UN Member States, a notable gap remains in universal enforcement 
of the laws of war. Strikingly, once more, among the 78 States not Party to the 
Rome Statute are some of the most military significant states of the world.  
Nevertheless, the institutional development for enforcement is a meaningful 
addition to the international legal framework. On substantive and procedural 
fronts, the destruction of the natural environment is recognized as a prosecutable 
war crime. Although it is merely one out of 128 legal provisions, Drumble 
emphasizes that “for the first time, environmental war crimes are independently 
sanctioned and an apparatus is provided for the punishment of those who commit 
such crimes.” Even so, he adds, the inclusion of environmental crime into the 
International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction is still a “cause for limited celebration 
and some disappointment.” 337 Rome Statute Article 8 (2)(b)(iv) stipulates:   
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would 
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated.338 
 
Generally speaking, there are a few reasons for the limited celebration of the 
Rome Statue. Foremost is that the law being set forth is applicable only in an 
international context. Therefore, environmental war crimes that may be caused 
during an internal conflict would not fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction. Thus in 
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the event of such an armed conflict, the natural environment remains vulnerable 
to the various methods and means of an eco-criminal.  
Jensen argues that the opportunity was made available to add the necessary 
clarification and resolve current ambiguities needed to enforce environmental 
protection during wartime, but the opportunity was missed.339 One of the relevant 
ambiguities in need of further clarification was in relation to the widespread, 
long-term and severe threshold of harm; however, no definition was provided.  
Considering that the Rome Statute was “silent on this point,” the International 
Law Commission (ILC) set forth that the terms widespread, long-term and severe 
describe the “extent or intensity of the damage, its persistence in time, and the 
size of the geographical area affected by the damage.”340  
The “widespread” and “long-term” principles attempt to ascribe temporal and 
geographic limitations to environmental harm which, for the most part, does not 
know such boundaries. As the planet constitutes one single ecosystem, one part of 
the earth ultimately affects the entire planet. The “severe” requirement could mean 
that damage to an isolated section of the global commons whose natural resources 
have not yet been valued by the global financial markets could escape punishment; 
and this notwithstanding its biodiversity or species of importance.341 
 
Dinstein also notes some gaps in the protection for the natural environment. The 
first gap entails the elements of intention and knowledge of an outcome, rather 
than intention or expectation as expressed under Additional Protocol I. In 
addition, the damage caused to the natural environment must be clearly excessive 
to the military advantage anticipated to be considered a ‘war crime’.342  
The language used seems to grant an upper-hand toward military gain, as it must 
be proven that the HCP had both intention and knowledge. These elements are 
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needed to establish the required mens rea to impose penal sanctions.343 In fact, 
Drumbl asserts that all three components must be proven:  
(1) physical act or actus reus, an attack which causes "widespread, long-term and 
severe damage" to the natural environment;  
 
(2) damage must be “clearly excessive” in relation to the “concrete and direct overall 
military advantage anticipated”; and  
 
(3) mental element or mens rea, must be demonstrated, thereby entailing proof that 
the attack was launched intentionally and in the knowledge it will cause "widespread, 
long-term and severe damage" to the natural environment.344  
 
It is now reasonable to ask if the military commanders and combatants are 
equipped with scientific environmental data to carry out their targeting decisions 
properly. For without this element of knowledge, it seems that environmental 
ignorance can likely become the high contracting parties “get out of jail free 
card.” In fairness, it is unreasonable to expect military commanders or 
combatants to be ecologists! In my view, this is an area of constant concern and 
therefore, it should require the further development and integration of 
intelligence fields. A sort of “environmental intelligence” (EI) is perhaps a 
meaningful and logical step for the future generations. 
With respect to the ICC, in order to enhance protection of the natural 
environment under the Rome Statute, there have been a few suggestions made. 
The first proposal is to amend Article 8 by removing the distinction between 
international and internal conflict and therefore, prevent unnecessary procedural 
problems.345 Secondly, in view of the fact that the effect must be intended or 
foreseeable, it might not deter significant environmental harm. Drumbl claims 
that the majority of damage being done to the natural environment is caused by 
negligent or reckless conduct. He suggests that in order to address this concern 
that an objective element needs to be incorporated into the intentionality 
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requirement and that responsibility should be placed where there is a ‘reasonable 
expectation’ that environmental damage could occur, as within API.346 
Otherwise, it may not actually deter criminal behaviour, which is what the 
International Criminal Court intends to do.347 
In addition, it seems that another opportunity has been missed. The Rome Statute 
does not grant special protection for the natural environment by expressly 
identifying it as a civilian object. Jensen maintains that although the Rome 
Statute makes intentional damage to the environment a war crime, it is 
prosecutable only if it is done as “part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-
scale commission of such crime.”348  
The only attempt ever made to prosecute environmental war crimes was at the 
Nuremberg trials for the offence of scorched earth tactics; however, tribunals 
have limited power in such matters. It is believed that permanent institutions, for 
instance, the International Court of Justice or International Criminal Court are 
needed to replace ad hoc tribunals in order to provide a consistent and 
meaningful approach toward addressing the environmental consequences in 
wartime, particularly in a non-international context.349  
As discussed earlier, there are various indirect and direct methods of attempting 
to protect the natural environment. Indirectly speaking, under the Rome Statute, 
some protection is being granted through the prohibition on the excessive 
destruction of property, use of poison, use of indiscriminate weapons, and 
depriving of civilians of objects indispensible to their survival.350  
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Regarding the direct methods of protection, the widespread, long-term and severe 
threshold of harm has limitations in its application which seem consistent with 
the concerns expressed under Additional Protocol I. However, there are other 
important concerns which surround the meaningful application of the law. Some 
of these grey areas involve the requirement of intent and knowledge of the 
environmental destruction, the lack of environmental expertise within the 
criminal court, a lack of political will, and other procedural hurdles. In fact, in 
view of these shortcomings or perhaps considering that these are pragmatically 
the early stages of the development of the law in these matters, “no state has ever 
been held accountable for environmental destruction, and no individual has ever 
been convicted of environmental war crimes.”351 Weinstein believes that it is a 
reflection of values amid the international community of states. 
Regardless, the value of environmental matters is undoubtedly increasing amid 
the public conscience. This is evident following the case of the Gulf War, as 
there was clear disregard for the unlawful destruction of the natural environment.  
Locke once believed that “those who break the law are a threat to us all, as they 
will tend to undermine our peace and safety.”352 Rio Declaration stated that 
“peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and 
indivisible.”353 Although the expressed aim of the Rio Declaration is a non-
binding instrument, it may still provide useful insights. Without justice, there is 
no peace. Without peace, there is no development. And ultimately, without 
meaningful protection for the natural environment in wartime the attainment of 
sustainable development is unlikely.   This is yet another vital link between 
international humanitarian law and sustainable development. With state 
responsibility toward the common interest of global justice, Our Common Future 
advises: 
                                              
351 Weinstein, Tara. (2005): Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environmental Crimes or 
Humanitarian Atrocities. Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. 
352 Wolff, Jonathan. (2006:20): An Introduction to Political Philosophy. USA: Oxford University Press.  
353 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1992). Rio Declaration. Principle 25.(Earth 
Summit Rio de Janeiro. 19th plenary meeting. (emphasis mine) 
 115
Sustainability requires the enforcement of wider responsibilities for the impacts of 
decisions. This requires changes in the legal and institutional frameworks that will enforce 
the common interest. Some necessary changes in the legal framework start from the 
environment adequate for health and well-being is essential for all human beings – 
including future generations.354 
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5. The Development of Meaningful Protection 
for the Natural Environment in Wartime 
5.1 The Character of the Conflict 
On the topic of protection for the natural environment during hostilities, the 
character of the conflict is an essential distinction to reconsider.  It is also a vital 
link between international humanitarian law and sustainable development 
because it determines the applicable law governing hostilities, and therefore, the 
level of protection granted. In other words, there are different rules which apply 
in different conflict settings. As it stands now, the protection of the natural 
environment is not consistent throughout the framework of IHL.  
One main reason that an inconsistency arises within international humanitarian 
law is because of the prerequisite to categorize conflict. In the event of an armed 
conflict, there are three different classifications to consider: an international 
armed conflict (IAC), a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) and matters of 
internal disturbance.   
Why is this so important? It is important because the amount of protection for the 
natural environment is based upon how the conflict is characterized. In the first 
classification as an international armed conflict, there is some direct protection 
being afforded to the natural environment under Additional Protocol I, if states 
are high contracting parties. In the second classification as a non-international or 
internal armed conflict, the protection being afforded is merely indirect. Finally, 
in the third classification as a matter of internal disturbance, such as, riots or 
hostilities of a lesser degree, IHL is not applicable. 
The characterization of an international armed conflict is when a formal 
declaration of war is made or when armed force is being used between two or 
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more States.355 It is also considered an IAC when part or an entire territory of a 
state is being occupied, whether that occupation meets resistance or not, or when 
individuals rise to fight against alien occupation, colonial domination or racist 
regimes in the struggle toward the fulfilment of their right to self-
determination.356 During an international armed conflict, the applicable laws are: 
the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, customary international law and 
related conventions. However, it is important to recall that regarding the 
application of Additional Protocol I and related conventions only the States 
Parties are obliged.   
More elusive, the characterization of a non-international armed conflict is 
sometimes more challenging to make a distinction. ICRC highlights that one 
distinguishing characteristic of an internal conflict is that one conflicting party is 
a non-state armed group or organized armed group (OAG).357 Additionally, it is 
considered an internal conflict when one organized armed group fights another 
within the territory of a state; however, the conflict could cross jurisdictional 
borders. During times of internal armed conflict, the applicable laws are: 
Additional Protocol II, Common Article 3, customary international law and 
related conventions.358 Similar to treaty law requirements of Additional Protocol 
I, only the States Parties are obliged under Additional Protocol II and related 
conventions. 
A key concern is that the qualification of the conflict character is not always an 
easy distinction to make. For instance, when does a matter of internal disturbance 
reach the level of violence in order to become classified as a non-international 
armed conflict? Moreover, the conflict characterization could change between an 
international and non-international, dependent upon the parties involved at that 
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time. Thus, the rules which govern hostilities must also adapt to the conflict at 
hand, while targeting decisions are often taken in matters of a split second. Case 
in point, according to the ICTY Appeal Chamber: 
The conflict could have been characterized as both internal and international, or 
alternatively, as an internal conflict alongside an international one, or as an internal 
conflict that had become internationalized because of external support, or as an 
international conflict that had subsequently been replaced by one or more internal 
conflicts, or some combination thereof.359 
 
As stated above, when the characterization of a conflict is branded as 
internationalized, it simply implies that an intervention has occurred by one or 
more foreign states, as discussed in the Kosovo case. In particular, NATO had 
intervened during a non-international armed conflict, and therefore the conflict 
became an internationalized one. Be that as it may, this changing nature presents 
added complexities, as not all states are high contracting parties to Additional 
Protocol I and therefore the determination of the laws applicable presents more 
complications in the protection of the natural environment. How should IHL 
apply in these cases?  
In the end, it all boils down to the general idea that the natural environment is 
virtually unprotected during a non-international armed conflict. During a NIAC, 
the ICC lacks jurisdiction and, as a result, ‘environmental war crimes’ remain 
unassailable within the territory of a state. The principle of national sovereignty 
remains both a matter of international respect and concern. As the belligerents 
with the territory of a state may not have the appropriate means of deterrence and 
thus, environmental damage which may arise from internal conflicts may escape 
matters of criminal responsibility, unless the damage becomes a transboundary 
concern.360 As Ehrlich emphasizes regarding the sovereignty principle:  
The difficulty in changing the rule in international relations is uncertainty about the 
best way to achieve disarmament and security in a world where in the past security 
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has been usually provided by brute force either threatened or overtly exercised. The 
basic requirement is evident: once again it is a change in human attitudes so that the 
in-group against which aggression is forbidden expands to include all human beings. 
The first step necessarily involves partial surrender of sovereignty to an international 
organization.361 
 
In a court of law, the prosecution is required “to establish the nature of relevant 
armed conflict in every case of alleged war crimes.” The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) demonstrated several inefficiencies 
associated with this prolonged task of providing evidence and arguments for the 
conflict character where the alleged crimes were said to have been perpetrated in 
each case.362  To overcome these complex hurdles in the prosecution of war 
crimes, Wilmott put forward to remove the distinction of the conflict character. 
What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be 
inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife.363   
 
The removal of the distinction of the character of the conflict should provide a 
more meaningful protection to the natural environment in wartime. Additionally, 
it should also provide a more realistic platform for sustainable development. For 
instance, Roberts emphasizes that a substantial amount of environmental damage 
from military activities has led to vital sustainability concerns such as famine, 
inhospitable land, toxic pollution and other physical limitations upon the 
landscapes such as the employment of anti-personnel mines.364  
Not only in an IAC, but also during a NIAC, the damage to the natural 
environment caused by military activities could become a vital link to national 
security and consequently, sustainability of the state. Former Secretary of the Air 
Force, Verne Orr believes that “future warfare may not exist in the traditional 
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sense. It may be nothing more than well-organized and coordinated terrorism, 
perpetrated by highly dedicated and heavily armed terrorist on a mass scale.”365  
According to Houchins, if modern warfare tactics has changed or in effect has 
blurred the IAC/NIAC battlefield, “international law may apply to individuals 
through their nationality.”366 However, the problem or precautionary concern 
becomes that “with increased travel and financial means for specific terrorist 
groups, terrorist are abandoning their nationality and taking refuge in other 
countries. Arguably, international law should apply through the care-taking 
country to the harboured terrorist, but that connection to terrorists and 
international law seems tenuous.367 Within the past few decades the international 
community has unquestionably had to reconsider its internal and external affairs 
in light of this persistent threat. The Environmental Law Institute affirms: 
Failure to address internal conflicts can lead to future conflicts, as wartime 
environmental devastation can reduce the ability of a nation's infrastructure to satisfy 
basic needs of its citizenry, thereby destabilizing the country.368 
 
In an effort to provide improved expressions and therefore enforce a more 
practical approach to protect the natural environment in wartime, some 
recommendations were made with reference to the Rome Statue of the ICC. It is 
believed that the following revisions might be of assistance to the international 
community in overcoming some procedural hurdles, and as such, create a more 
efficient and effective framework to encourage a more meaningful environmental 
protection of states.  
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Besides removing the conflict character distinction, another proposal aims to 
remove the distinction between ‘grave breaches’ and ‘serious violations.’ The 
ICTY Appeals Chamber states that “grave breaches are only committed in an 
international armed conflict and that persons or property will only be ‘protected’ 
during an international armed conflict.”369 Once more, it appears that a lack of 
integration is hampering meaningful protection for the natural environment.  
Additionally, it has been proposed to merge Articles 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(c) in order 
to consolidate offences into a single list of war crimes applicable in all armed 
conflicts, whether international or internal.370 In support of streamlining such 
endeavours, it has been suggested that Articles 8(2)(d) and 8(2)(f) should be 
deleted, and the ICTY Appeals Chamber definition of armed conflict utilized: 
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed 
groups or between such groups within a State.371 
 
Naturally the prospect of an environmental war crime is not only possible during 
an international armed conflict, but also in a non-international context. Evidence 
of such environmental threats has been well-noted in the previous cases studied 
of the Gulf War and Kosovo Conflict. In view of that fact, the prerequisite of 
conflict characterization should be dissolved in order to establish the necessary 
means to protect the natural environment, which is an indispensable constituent 
to both national security and sustainable development. Other inconsistencies 
which prevent the meaningful application and legal enforcement of IHL should 
also be re-evaluated as the natural environment is a vital concern of not only 
national, but also regional and international peace and security. Recognizing the 
need for a compatibility and integration of the law, the Expert Group affirms: 
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The Expert Group regarded the principles of interrelationship and integration as the 
backbone of sustainable development. It emphasized that interrelationship as a 
principle contributing to the achievement of sustainable development depends on the 
respect of each legal domain for the scope and content of adjacent bodies of law and 
that sustainable development will be enhanced if competing legal rules strive as a 
first step toward compatibility and as a second step toward mutual support.372 
5.2 The Development of Special Protection  
Throughout the framework of IHL a sort of “road map” is offered which grants 
special protection to specific categories of persons and objects. During 
hostilities, this special protection status is intended to support military 
commanders in making well-informed targeting decisions. Accordingly, through 
this guidance the legal framework establishes some added points of principled 
reflection and duties in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives.   
As a general rule, specifically protected persons and objects are not to become 
the object of an attack, unless it is deemed an imperative military necessity.373 
However, if the target is perceived as a military necessity, the protection once 
granted to that particular person or object may become withdrawn. For instance, 
special protection is granted to the cultural and spiritual heritage of peoples. In 
particular, protected objects such as places of worship, monuments of 
architecture, works of art or history, archaeological sites, manuscripts, books and 
other scientific collections374  are formally protected by means of a universal 
system of emblematic distinctions. For that reason, military command is required 
to keep informed on the location of specifically protected objects and 
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establishments.375 These aforesaid are also not to be used in support of military 
efforts or become the object of reprisals.376  
Respecting such treasures of civilization, an identification and protection of the 
cultural and spiritual heritage of peoples was strengthened through The Hague 
Convention of 14 May 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event 
of Armed Conflict. In the course of this Convention, a special protection for 
cultural properties was officially established under treaty law. The United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was 
properly endorsed with an international mandate for its implementation.377  
The approach taken to ensure the implementation for this vision began with a 
systematic inventory of specifically protected cultural properties. Once 
identified, the selected locations are registered and then may become marked by 
an emblematic distinction. Although the absence of an emblem does not permit 
the attack on such objects or locations, this sign may be utilized to provide 
informational support in order to better identify the location of a cultural heritage 
of peoples and thus, offer special protection in the event of an armed conflict: 
 
 
Figure 3: Emblematic distinction of Cultural Property 
 
The present legal framework of IHL or related Conventions does not however 
provide a comparable “road map” for the special protection of the natural 
heritage of peoples.  Following the mass destruction of World War I, UNESCO 
was not only mandated with the task of paying special attention to global threats 
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concerning the cultural and spiritual heritage of peoples, but also the natural 
heritage.378 Enshrined within the Convention concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Article 6 (2) states: 
The States Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, 
to give their help in the identification, protection, conservation and presentation of 
the cultural and natural heritage...379 
 
 
In a proactive pursuit toward the fulfilment of its international mandate, 
UNESCO currently lists 704 cultural, 180 natural and 27 mixed natural/cultural 
properties in 151 States Parties which have been declared as holding an 
“outstanding universal value.”380 In view of that, these exceptional sites have 
been aesthetically assessed, scientifically appraised, clearly identified and visibly 
mapped as part of the world heritage list.381 As of June 2010, a total of 187 States 
Parties had ratified the 1972 World Heritage Convention.382  With this significant 
level of participation among the States Parties, clearly it is an indication toward 
the overall interest and value of such an initiative. As part of an international 
pledge among States Parties, the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
Convention states: 
The Convention sets out the duties of States Parties in identifying potential sites and 
their role in protecting and preserving them. By signing the Convention, each 
country pledges to conserve not only the World Heritage sites situated on its 
territory, but also to protect its national heritage.383 
 
But now, what happens in the event of an armed conflict? There is a concerted 
effort to protect the cultural and spiritual heritage of peoples on the battlefield, 
but what about the natural? UNESCO has undertaken an effort to categorize and 
protect world natural heritage sites, such as: tropical rainforests, traditional 
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forests, endangered species habitats, protected national parks, glacial lakes, coral 
reefs, biosphere reserves, safari areas, caves and mountainous areas, freshwater 
wetland ecosystems, vegetations, wildlife and diverse species habitats and a 
variety of other sensitive ecosystems and ecological processes which are 
considered rich in biological and ecological diversity. Many of these locations 
are regarded as hosting special qualities which contribute to the overall wellbeing 
of ecosystems, and the planetary system as a whole. For instance, the Amazon 
Rain Forest, Yellowstone National Park, Coiba National Park and its Special 
Zone of Marine Protection, and the Great Barrier Reef384 are presently listed, to 
name just a few. There are various aesthetic and scientific reasons that UNESCO 
endeavours to draw attention to such rare and distinctive elements of the world’s 
natural heritage. These natural heritage sites are foreseen as global natural 
treasures for all humankind. Accentuating a need to protect natural heritage sites 
from harm, the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage states:  
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to take any deliberate 
measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultural and natural 
heritage referred to in Articles 1 and situated on the territory of other States 
Parties to this Convention.385 
 
 
Considering that special protection is established for the cultural and spiritual 
heritage of peoples under IHL, but not the natural heritage, this should present a 
deep concern for sustainable development. It is convincing that the identification 
and protection granted toward the cultural and spiritual heritages of peoples is a 
vital link to human wellbeing, and therefore a direct contribution toward the 
global aim of SD. However, what about the world’s natural heritage of peoples? 
How might these natural treasures, such as tropical rainforests, national parks, 
endangered species habitats and other sensitive ecosystems be protected under 
IHL? Is it possible that IHL currently grants more protection to cultural art or 
museums in comparison to vital global ecosystems? Simply put – it seems so. 
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One of the most significant threats facing the world today is ecological. In the 
contemporary line of sight, there is the strong concern of global climatic change, 
acid rain, contamination of atmospheric conditions and soil, toxic waste disposal 
and massive deforestation. The core problem is that these potential dangers not 
only cause distress for a particular part of the world; they threaten the stability of 
the entire planet.  
Falk reaffirms that four interconnected threats facing the planet are wars of mass 
destruction, pollution, overpopulation, and the depletion of natural resources. 
Decades ago, the concern was raised “of the need to protect the global 
environment and lay down new principles and rules...addressing the 
environmental impact of state activity.”386 In addition, Dinstein forewarns that 
environmental modification can be inflicted by conventional methods and means 
of warfare from the systematic destruction by fire of the Amazon River Basin 
rainforests which could induce a global climatic change.387  
In view of these potential environmental threats to the international community, 
if states adhere to taking all precautionary measures, it seems that the 
development of special protection for the natural environment is the next logical 
advancement in IHL. For practical purposes, an expansion in the legal 
framework could assist military commanders in the proper identification of 
natural heritage sites. As a result, it should provide a practical method to better 
distinguish important areas of the natural environment in the event of an armed 
conflict. Not only might the added support provide the basic environmental 
intelligence proclaimed to be lacking during military operations today, but it 
should also assist in the reduction of unnecessary collateral damage onto the 
                                                                                                                                    
385 Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), Art. 6(3) (emphasis 
mine) 
386 Giorgetta, Sueli. (2002:176): The Right to a Healthy Environment, Human Rights and Sustainable Development. 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 2: Netherlands: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers.  
387 Dinstein, Yoram (2004:181): The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict. United 
States. Cambridge University Press.  
 127
natural environment. Otherwise, how else could it be possible to grant such 
protection? Bruch maintains:  
IHL…has expanded to protect not only combatants, but also prisoners of war, the 
civilian population, property, and historical and cultural monuments. Now that the 
law of war recognizes not only humanitarian concerns, but also our material, cultural 
and aesthetic legacy, it is a small leap to propose and "environmental law of war."388 
5.3 Distinctive Emblem for the Natural Environment 
In peacetime, there are numerous aspects of the natural environment properly 
identified and protected. In wartime, on the other hand, it is quite a different 
story. Although previously stated that the natural environment is an object of 
special protection during hostilities, there are no real means for its practical 
identification or protection throughout the entire legal framework of IHL. 
For this reason, without the necessary means toward the proper identification of 
specifically protected natural environments, it is reasonable to consider that 
widespread, long-term and severe environmental harm might arise pertaining to 
disproportionate, indiscriminate, and inhumane attacks in the event of armed 
conflict. Without a clear distinction for natural environments of special 
significance, the fundamental principle of military necessity clearly does not 
have the means to ensure its proper application required in order to uphold the 
other customary practices of IHL. This is a relevant weakness of IHL. Without 
this clear-cut indication of specifically protected natural environments, there is 
no effective means to implement obligatory countermeasures to respect and to 
ensure respect of IHL. As a consequence, unnecessary collateral damage may 
arise unto the natural environmental from ill-informed military operations.  
It is important to keep in mind that transboundary environmental harm may also 
arise and affect neutral countries that are not party to the conflict, as highlighted 
in all of the collective case studies above. This simple fact should warrant a 
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careful attention, as it is a common interest amid matters of international 
relations. As it stands now, the international community of states and its peoples, 
still seem to have an ‘unfinished system’ of environmental protection. Hence, it 
is my view that the overall framework needed to attain SD is incomplete.  
For the purpose of this Convention, international protection of the world cultural and 
natural heritage shall be understood to mean the establishment of a system of 
international co-operation and assistance designed to support States Parties to the 
Convention in their efforts to conserve and identify that heritage.389 
 
Since the start of IHL, a system of universal communication and co-operation 
began with a ‘sign’. Nowadays it is straightforward practice in the facilitation of a 
common system of identification and special protection on the battlefield. Nation-
states worldwide have adopted emblematic distinctions to pinpoint a range of 
military/civilian medical services, military/civilian religious personnel, civil 
defense, cultural objects, and works and installations containing dangerous forces, 
such as dams, dykes, and nuclear power plants.390 On the other hand, the natural 
environment now foreseen as a fundamental constituent toward the attainment of 
sustainable development has no current means to facilitate its identification or 
protection. This finding is a vital link between IHL and SD which may be worthy 
of further consideration and development. 
Without a forseeability element in plain position regarding the precaution of 
concealed environmental threats, it is reasonable to deduce that the effective 
deterrence mechanisms or subsequent means to promote prosecution will not 
likely transpire. If prospective grave or serious environmental damage cannot be 
foreseen, how then could the intent be demonstrated in order to enforce criminal 
prosecution? The Environmental Law Institute has confirmed that “existing and 
emerging norms generally require that the military commander intend the 
environmental damage or should have known that it would occur (that the 
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damage was reasonably foreseeable).391 Based on this analysis, there appears to 
be a fundamental missing link within the legal framework of IHL, which 
ultimately, imposes a direct threat toward securing the underlying conditions 
necessary to uphold the international target of sustainable development. Richard 
Gamble claims: 
Intelligence…image, electronic and human…is essential to determine which target 
poses an environmental threat, and which weapon to use to eliminate the target. One 
must know the weak points that make a target vulnerable, and the features that can 
be environmentally dangerous. Failure to obtain this information may result in an 
environmental disaster.392 
 
Regarding the current legal framework of IHL, this vital intelligence component 
is seemingly absent. However, there are various advancements still being made 
within related institutions that may be utilized in the development and eventual 
dependability of added protection concerning the natural environment. Based on 
the critical assessment thus far, it seems that the military commanders, the 
international legal system and the global community as a whole, could benefit 
from the better integration of such knowledge by means of an environmental 
intelligence system (EIS) in partnership with a new universal emblematic 
distinction for the natural environment. For example, in an effort to better 
manage the global commons, Our Common Future has suggested:  
Nations could deploy the latest satellite mapping and other techniques to put together 
an inventory of these resources and then monitor changes in them. 393 
 
Perhaps it is a wheel that may not need reinvention; it implies more reflection on 
improved means for international co-operation, institutional integration and 
systematic implementation. As previously revealed through the concerted efforts 
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of UNESCO, UNEP and other relevant institutions, this pressing need for pooled 
environmental intelligence might be leveraged using established databases of 
these compatible institutions. As a result, it may contribute toward a practical 
harmonizing effort toward global environmental wellbeing in better support of 
their intended institutional functions.  
In wartime, as similar to the cultural and spiritual heritage of peoples, the 
beginning of specifically protected natural environments could also then benefit 
through the identification and mapping through a new and universal distinctive 
emblem. It has been recommended to point to environmental related concerns by 
the use of a Green Cross, however, in the past; the emblematic selection of the 
Red Cross had encountered disparities based upon perceived religious 
connotations. If history should repeats itself in this matter, then perhaps other 
emblems such as the ‘Green Crescent or Green Crystal’ may need to be adopted 
in order to assemble a truly universal green system. 
In an attempt to unite and transcend these dividing connotations which have 
plagued world history throughout past generations and figuratively speaking, has 
been fueling the continual source of chronic conflicts, herein I would like to 
suggest an alternative solution. To better protect the natural environment in the 
event of an armed conflict, I would like to propose a new universal distinctive 
emblem.  
                                                          
                                         
                                       Figure 4: Proposed Distinctive Emblem for the Natural Environment 
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The time has now arrived to provide an emblematic representation toward the 
protection of the natural environment in armed conflict. If specifically protected 
cultural heritage sites, such as, cultural artwork and museums are presently 
valued, marked and protected, the next appropriate step seems to reconsider the 
formal inclusion of natural heritage sites, such as, protected areas, endangered 
species habitats, fragile ecosystems and other pertinent locations? It is part of our 
individual and collective moral and increasingly, legal responsibility to protect 
and care for the future generations. Considering that the natural environment 
sustains all life on Earth, perhaps, it is now time to signify the thought, even in 
wartime. Hobbes has suggested:  
For reason, in this sense is nothing but reckoning (that is adding and subtracting) of 
the consequences of general names agreed upon for the marking and signifying of 
our thoughts; I say marking them when we reckon by ourselves, and signifying, 
when we demonstrate or approve our reckonings to other men.394 
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6. Conclusion 
Considering the realities of modern warfare, the conclusion is that the protection of the 
natural environment in the event of an armed conflict is inadequate. Several notable 
weaknesses have been identified regarding the substantive and institutional 
inadequacies within the law of war regime.   
In the early twentieth century, international humanitarian law did not initially express 
rules, principles and customs to alleviate the calamities of war relative to the natural 
environment. However, toward the end of the century, there were new enemies 
approaching the battlefield. It was the prevailing threat of ecocides and eco-criminals. 
Traditionally, IHL has developed in light of post-war reflections and has also 
extended its purpose to heed the call of environmental protection. Nevertheless, in 
periods of being confronted with the reality of widespread, long-term and severe 
environmental destruction – none of the IHL rules had enough force to prevent, 
protect or enforce environmental war crimes. There are several notable weaknesses 
inherent in IHL. 
The first one is a clear inability to formally define what the natural environment 
actually is. Clarification and consensus are needed to prevent interpretative 
disagreements and boost protection. Three elements offering insight toward the 
establishment of a formal working definition are – the physical, the biological and the 
chemical. Concerning the dual-use purpose of these elements in light of modern 
warfare, it would be pertinent to reconsider the development of the environmental 
intelligence and institutional capacities in order to attend to related emergency 
responses. These capabilities should be underscored and considered as a vital link to 
sustainable development.  
The second notable weakness of IHL is a general tendency to consider the human 
person and the natural environment as separate matters of legal concern. Although 
biological solidarity between the human person and natural environment has been 
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established almost a century ago, the compounding damages are apparently not being 
reflected in balancing tests or matters of criminal responsibility.  
The third weakness noted is that although there is a customary prohibition of poison or 
employment of arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury, it 
seemingly has not offered prevention or protection from harm in these cases studied. 
Some military significant states have demonstrated an inherent manipulation of IHL 
and other states have ignored compliance obligations in these matters. As such, the 
principle of national sovereignty could become a notable weakness in the overall 
international legal framework. There remains strong concern about the illegality of 
military activities and impunity of environmental war crimes. 
Fourthly, IHL provisions offer assorted methods to protect the natural environment, but 
their practical use is debatable. The main legal texts have established both indirect and 
direct methods toward protection; however, none has proven effective in each case 
studied. At the present time, the establishment of strict limitations on the destruction of 
the natural environment remains questionable in relation to geographical area, temporal 
scope and severity of the harm.  
Regarding direct methods under Additional Protocol I and the ENMOD Convention – 
the WLS threshold of harm is considered inadequate. Terminological imprecision is 
one main drawback. In its cumulative position as widespread, long-term and severe 
damage, the legal threshold of harm is generally viewed as too high. In addition, 
environmental damage would need to be scientifically proven. For that reason, a 
recurrent dilemma is the lack of environmental baseline data, as well as related 
instruments and methods to calculate and valuate the environmental damage that has 
been inflicted. Another complication in the overall damage assessment is the inability to 
separate peacetime and wartime damage in order to draw accurate conclusions to 
support liability claims.  
It seems that ecosystem inventories or natural heritage sites records are central toward 
the establishment of environmental baseline data. This element of an environmental 
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intelligence system would seem to be required toward the overall aim in the deterrence 
or prosecution of future environmental war crimes.  
Fifthly noted, the ENMOD Convention is the only treaty to protect the natural 
environment from being used as a weapon of war; however, it has low-adherence and is 
virtually unknown and unenforced. In its current position, the vague language regarding 
modification techniques, narrow scope, lack of penal provisions and legal mechanisms 
to conduct proper investigations remains a concern. Considering that related violations 
are climatic modification, eradications of species, manipulation of ozone levels, and 
deforestation, the significance of geophysical warfare, it provides a clear link of 
importance toward the sustainable development agenda. Since ENMOD violations 
require scientific assessment of alleged environmental damage, its prospective 
enforcement should also benefit from the development of ecosystem inventories. The 
ENMOD Convention would be strengthened by universal ratification and improved 
international co-operation to ensure its full respect, implementation and compliance. On 
a positive note, it would also be interesting to ascertain the possibilities of its dual-use 
capabilities toward the peaceful utilization of the natural environment.  
Sixthly noted, the natural environment will not be adequately protected simply because 
of the military necessity doctrine. This position seems based on the realism of IHL in 
practice and necessitates further reconsideration in view of contemporary environmental 
challenges. It is a solution that should transcend individual state interest in order to 
establish a meaningful platform based on collective rationality through disciplined 
military culture of precaution and state responsibility. 
In addition to IHL principles, although these are part of customary international law 
applicable in all armed conflict, there is a notable weakness regarding a means to 
formulate practical balancing tests. It is essentially flawed. It is my conclusion, that the 
meaningful application of IHL principles will require the representation of the natural 
environment in order to be executed properly because there is no efficient and effective 
means to distinguish areas of ecological significance. The development of special 
protection and a distinctive emblem for the natural environment should be reconsidered 
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toward strengthening the legal framework in order to properly uphold and enforce the 
legitimacy of IHL. 
The next weakness is that there are specific rules in wartime which offer direct 
protection to the natural environment; however, disparities remain among states 
with regard to these environmental provisions as a matter of customary 
international law. Enhancing protection of the natural environment from a 
customary position remains in the general practice of states to establish evidence 
confirming its normative position accepted as law. On a positive note, it has been 
confirmed that the natural environment is a customary obligation regarding the 
application of IHL principles, although the particular rules remain in question.  
Elements of intentionality and foreseeability are crucial in the effectiveness of 
environmental protection in wartime. Environmental intelligence established through 
the cooperation of international institutions that may inform military command real-
time and surmount national sovereignty interests, seem essential in the proper 
enforcement of IHL to impartially ensure global environmental justice. This sphere of 
development presents an indispensible constituent toward the attainment of sustainable 
development as well as the legitimacy and respect for the law of war regime.   
Presently a “green road map” for military commanders to distinguish geographical 
locations of ecological significance on the battlefield does not exist. For example, 
protected areas, sensitive ecosystems and other vital aspects of the natural world are 
impossible to differentiate. In conclusion, I would like to suggest the consideration of 
leveraging and integrating existing environmental databases. For example, UNESCO 
and UNEP could provide meaningful platforms toward the creation of a tangible system 
and perhaps, reopen the discussion for environmental protection in wartime. Natural 
heritage sites are a common concern of the international community of states, and 
although there can be no guarantees with respect to environmental destruction in 
wartime, it is clear that these natural heritage sites could likely have an impact which 
extend beyond the combat zone in space and time.   
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Considering that a significant portion of recent military expenditure shall be invested in 
advanced communication technologies, it would be interesting to envisage UNESCOs 
natural heritage sites as well as other pertinent areas of national interests as part of an 
environmental intelligence system. Specifically protected natural environments could be 
electronically positioned via Global Positioning System, and therefore made readily 
available to inform military forces in command.  
Another notable weakness is that the direct protection of the natural environment 
is not consistent throughout the legal framework. The prerequisite to determine the 
character of the conflict places a tough demand regarding the qualification of a 
conflict character and hence an application of the law. Since it is a matter not set in 
stone and swift to change between an international and internal conflict, the 
protection of the natural environment is virtually dependent on the conflict 
character. International armed conflict should provide some direct and indirect 
protection under Additional Protocol I. The protection granted during a non-
international or internal conflict could range from some indirect under Additional 
Protocol II to none at all under Common Article 3. The character of the conflict 
remains an important matter to reconsider for sustainable development. The 
recommendation is to remove the distinction between the conflict type in order to 
overcome procedural hurdles and to better protect the natural environment in light 
of the modern warfare challenge.  
In sum, international humanitarian law is a vital link to sustainable development. 
Although IHLs sole purpose is to set limitations upon the methods and means in 
warfare, and protect persons not participating or no longer participating in the 
conflict, this aim toward protection cannot ignore the indispensible role of the 
natural environment. It is my conclusion that the destruction of the natural 
environment needs stricter limitations.  
The law should protect. That is what it is designed to do, prevent us from harm. 
Based on this critical assessment of IHL, the current legal framework is 
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inadequate in the protection of the natural environment in wartime. As Jean-
Jacques Rousseau reminds the public’s conscience: 
How many crimes, how many wars, how many murders, how many misfortunes and 
horrors, would that man have saved the human species, who pulling up the stakes or 
filling up the ditches should have cried to his fellow: Be sure not to listen to this 
imposter, you are lost, if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong equally to us all, 
and the earth itself to nobody!395  
 
 
                                              
395 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (2007:59) Discourse on the Origin of Inequality  
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